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INTRODUCTION
Congress recently enacted the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
1
2
(“CAFA”) to expand federal jurisdiction over class action lawsuits.
Congress was particularly alarmed by the targeting of plaintifffriendly jurisdictions in state courts for the determination of lawsuits
3
of national scope and interest. This type of forum shopping has
thrived in recent years in the securities context. Stemming from the
largest corporate frauds in history such as Enron and WorldCom,
lawsuits have proliferated in state courts across the country for the
4
sole purpose of avoiding federal court jurisdiction.
Despite
addressing these very concerns in the general class action context,
Congress curiously exempted the federal securities laws from the
5
provisions of CAFA.
The explanation is apparent:
an
underappreciation of the overly nuanced jurisdictional framework for
private rights of action under the federal securities laws.
Private rights of action have been an integral part of the federal
securities enforcement scheme since its original formulation in the
6
wake of the stock market crash of 1929. These provisions are, in
essence, a means of investor protection. With the ebbs and flows of
the securities markets, however, investor protection has been a
fluctuating concept in the eyes of Congress. In bad times, investors
merit protection from corporate wrongdoers and securities

1. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.).
2. Id. § 2(b)(2) (explaining that the purpose of CAFA is to grant federal courts
the ability to consider interstate cases of national significance under diversity
jurisdiction).
3. See infra notes 150-153 and accompanying text.
4. See infra Part II.B.
5. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 4(a)(2), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(9)(A)
(West Supp. 2005) (explaining that diversity jurisdiction, as provided under Section
1332(d)(2), is inapplicable to any class action that only involves a claim concerning a
security “as defined under section 16(f)(3) of the Securities Act of 1933 and section
28(f)(5)(E) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934”) (citation omitted); id. § 5(a),
28 U.S.C. § 1453(d)(1) (exempting from removal to federal district court as
provided under Section 1453 class actions that only involve a claim concerning a
security “defined under section 16(f)(3) of the Securities Act of 1933 and section
28(f)(5)(E) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934”) (citation omitted).
6. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 9 (1933) (providing victims of fraudulent securities
schemes with the ability to recover the securities’ purchase price or damages where
the sellers made false statements, omissions, or otherwise failed to exhibit due care).

COOK.OFFTOPRINTER

2006]

2/22/2006 2:34:45 PM

RECRAFTING THE JURISDICTIONAL FRAMEWORK

623

7

professionals manipulating the markets. In good times, investors
become the pawns of plaintiffs’ lawyers seeking to exploit their
8
clients’ misfortunes for their own gains. Under these competing
forces, the evolution of the private rights of action under the federal
securities laws is far from a model of clarity or consistency.
One form of investor protection has been particularly mangled in
this tug-of-war: the non-removal provision of the Securities Act of
9
1933 (“1933 Act”).
Although state and federal courts have
10
concurrent jurisdiction over 1933 Act claims, a defendant cannot
11
remove 1933 Act claims filed in state court to federal court. In
effect, Congress took the unusual step of preventing federal claims
12
Congress took the contrary
from being heard in federal court.
position the following year when enacting the Securities Exchange
13
Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”), by vesting the federal courts with exclusive
14
jurisdiction over claims thereunder.

7. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 2 (2002) (commenting that the “Corporate
and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002” plays an essential role in
reestablishing trust in the financial markets by faithfully preventing, exposing, and
prosecuting corporate fraud); id. at 17 (extending the statute of limitations for
victims of securities frauds so as to prevent unduly burdening their right to recovery);
S. REP. NO. 73-47, at 1 (1933) (describing the fundamental policy of the 1933 Act as
protecting the public from fraud and misrepresentation in securities sales); H.R. REP.
NO. 73-85, at 2 (recognizing that the “mass of essentially fraudulent securities”
demanded congressional action); H.R. REP. NO. 73-152, at 1 (1933) (Conf. Rep.)
(explaining that the purpose of the 1933 Act is to prevent fraudulent sales of
securities in interstate or foreign commerce).
8. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 32 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731 (describing how investors are always the “ultimate losers”
when issuers are victims of “extortionate ‘settlements’”); 144 CONG. REC. H6059-60
(daily ed. July 21, 1998) (statement of Rep. Cox) (commenting that securities
plaintiffs’ lawyers brought lawsuits for their own benefit, not for their allegedly
defrauded clients); id. (remarking that more than one half of the top 150 companies
in Silicon Valley alone were victims of such exploitative suits and that plaintiffs
received only between six and fourteen cents on the dollar in settlements).
9. Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-bbbb (2000)).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a).
11. Id.
12. Claims arising under federal law generally fall within the original jurisdiction
of federal courts and are subject to removal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) (granting
federal district courts with original jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”); id. § 1441(a) (“Except as
otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of
which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be
removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United
States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is
pending.”) (emphasis added).
13. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a-mm (2000)).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa.
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This bipartite jurisdictional framework remains today, but with
even greater nuance imposed by the recent wave of federal securities
legislation. In 1995, Congress enacted the Private Securities Law
15
Reform Act (“PSLRA”) to add a number of procedural and pleading
requirements on federal securities claims—particularly those under
16
the 1934 Act. It soon became obvious that plaintiffs could sidestep
17
the PSLRA by filing actions under state law and/or in state court.
Congress quickly sought to close this loophole by enacting the
18
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (“SLUSA”),
which subjected class actions “based upon the statutory or common
law of any State” to removal to federal court and preemption by
19
federal law.
However, state law was not the only loophole. The heart of the
PSLRA—the heightened pleading requirements for securities fraud
20
class actions—does not apply to 1933 Act claims. Nor does SLUSA,
21
which by its plain language applies only to state law claims. Via the
non-removal provision, plaintiffs could therefore file 1933 Act claims
in state court to seek recovery for the same securities fraud without
22
the strictures of SLUSA and much of the PSLRA. Indeed, purely for
jurisdictional purposes, plaintiffs’ lawyers have filed scores of
individual actions exclusively under the 1933 Act in state court as one
segment of the massive litigation stemming from the largest
23
corporate frauds in history.
In the process, this “de facto class
15. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
16. See infra notes 102-112 and accompanying text.
17. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 14-15 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (observing that
plaintiffs’ lawyers have evaded the PSLRA’s provisions that protect against
exploitative suits by filing “frivolous and speculative suits in State court, where
essentially none of the [PSLRA]’s procedural or substantive protections against
abusive suits are available”); Michael A. Perino, A Census of Securities Class Action
Litigation After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, in 1015 CORPORATE
LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES: SECURITIES LITIGATION, 1043, 1046
(Practicing Law Institute 1997) (revealing that securities class action suits shifted
significantly from federal to state court as a result of plaintiffs’ wishing to evade the
“procedural and substantive hurdles” Congress created with the passage of the
PSLRA).
18. Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.).
19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(b)-(c), 78bb(b)-(c) (2000).
20. See id. § 78u-4(b) (applying heightened pleading requirements to “any private
action” arising under the 1934 Act).
21. See infra Part II.A.
22. See infra Part II.A-B.
23. For example, in the case of WorldCom, one law firm has filed at least fortyseven individual actions in state court on behalf of 120 plaintiffs in at least eight
states. See Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. WorldCom, Inc., 368 F.3d 86, 91 (2d Cir.
2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1080 (2005); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. Civ.023288, 2003 WL 22701241, at *5 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2003) (recognizing that
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24

action” in state court has frustrated the parallel litigation
25
consolidated in federal court.
Congress has not addressed this conspicuous loophole in the wake
of SLUSA. Remarkably, despite enacting measures in CAFA that
26
seem custom-made to combat this forum shopping,
Congress
27
decided expressly to exempt the federal securities laws therefrom.
The stated reason for this exemption was “not to disturb the carefully
crafted framework” of jurisdiction over securities claims established
28
in SLUSA. Given the obvious shortcomings of SLUSA, however, this
exemption begs the question: what exactly does Congress intend its
jurisdictional “framework” for securities claims to be?
This Article offers a solution to this quagmire that continues to
elude both Congress and the federal courts. Part I of this Article
provides an overview of the sequence of legislation that has shaped
private securities actions and, more specifically, their jurisdictional
provisions. That sequence comprises: (1) the 1933 Act and the
29
“interrelated” provisions of the 1934 Act; (2) the substantial
revisions to private securities litigation in the 1990s in the PSLRA and
30
SLUSA; and (3) the recent enactments of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
31
2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley Act”) and CAFA which, despite having less
direct impact on private securities litigation, suggest how to remedy
the federal securities jurisdictional framework in a manner consistent
32
with current legislative intent.
plaintiffs’ law firm chose “to file as many cases as possible” for its clients in various
states and sought to prevent removal and consolidation of the cases to a “single
federal court by the MDL Panel”); id. (finding that the plaintiffs’ law firm, cognizant
that filing 1934 Act claims would provide a basis for removal to federal court, avoided
filing 1934 Act claims altogether, even if filing those claims would “increase a
plaintiff’s leverage”).
24. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2003 WL 22701241, at *6.
25. See infra Part II.B.
26. See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 4(a)(2), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3)
(West Supp. 2005) (delineating a number of qualitative factors federal courts may
consider in exercising jurisdiction, including “whether the class action has been
pleaded in a manner that seeks to avoid Federal jurisdiction” and whether “other
class actions asserting the same or similar claims on behalf of the same or other
persons have been filed”).
27. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
28. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 50 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 46-47
(revealing that the Committee’s desire to leave Congress’s previously enacted
framework governing the adjudication of covered securities claims undisturbed
prompted it to exclude such claims from jurisdiction conferred by Section 1332(b)).
29. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206 (1976) (characterizing private
rights of action under the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act as “interrelated components of
the federal regulatory scheme governing securities transactions”). See infra Part I.A.
30. See infra Part I.B-C.
31. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, 29 U.S.C.). See infra Part I.D.
32. See infra Part I.E.
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Part II discusses recent judicial interpretations of the non-removal
provision of the 1933 Act in light of its amendment by SLUSA.
Courts have had to grapple with not only how to interpret the plain
language of the amendment (especially in light of clear legislative
33
intent to the contrary), but also how to minimize the actual
exploitation of its loopholes as highlighted in the massive litigation
34
generated by the likes of Enron and WorldCom.
Judicial
uncertainty on both issues—coupled with the expanse and impact of
the exploitation—highlight the need for immediate legislative reform
in the manner proposed here.
Part III details a proposed amendment to the non-removal
provision of the 1933 Act as a means of harmonizing the overall
jurisdictional framework for private rights of action under the federal
securities laws. Specifically, the non-removal provision should be
amended to permit removal of those 1933 Act claims which “sound in
fraud”—that is, those premised on allegations of fraudulent
35
conduct.
This proposal has a number of advantages. First, the
proposal reinforces a growing trend in federal securities litigation
and jurisprudence to apply certain federal procedural and securities
36
provisions to claims of fraud in both form and substance. Second,
the proposal would make the federal securities jurisdictional
framework consistent with various expressions of legislative intent by:
(1) preserving a plaintiff’s choice of forum as presumably intended in
37
the original enactment of the non-removal provision in 1933;
(2) curtailing the forum shopping targeted—but thus far missed—in
38
the PSLRA and SLUSA in the 1990s; and (3) reflecting a number of

33. See infra Part II.A.
34. See infra Part II.B.
35. See infra Part III. As discussed infra, plaintiffs can bring 1933 Act claims for
misrepresentations and omissions on theories of fraud, negligence, or strict liability.
See infra notes 49-65 and accompanying text. Regardless of the theory, 1933 Act
claims are often premised on the same allegations of fraudulent conduct as an
accompanying or substitute claim for fraud under the 1934 Act. See, e.g., Crowe v.
Deutsch Bank Alex Brown, 330 F. Supp. 2d 813, 818 (S.D. Miss. 2004) (commenting
that the alleged misconduct at issue in the plaintiff’s 1933 Act claim falls within the
scope of the “alleged scheme or ‘course of conduct’ to defraud” that is the basis of
the 1934 Act claim); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 315 F. Supp. 2d 527, 537
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (explaining that the 1933 Act claims against WorldCom in state
court arose from the “same underlying financial fraud” that forms the basis of the
1934 Act claims in federal court); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. Civ.02-3288,
2003 WL 22701241, at *5 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2003) (recognizing the strategy to
eschew the filing of 1934 Act claims that could have been brought along with or in
lieu of 1933 Act claims based on fraud allegations).
36. See infra Part III.A-B.
37. See infra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
38. See infra Part I.B-C.
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39

the measures recently implemented in CAFA in 2005. Third, this
proposal would nullify yet another byproduct of forum shopping:
piecemeal litigation of “otherwise non-removable” claims under
40
Section 1441(c) of the general removal statutes.
Fourth, the
proposal would promote both judicial economy and fairness to
41
investors by streamlining the “race for [the] assets” in securities
42
fraud litigation under uniform standards in federal court.
I.

LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND

A. The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
The 1933 Act was the federal legislative entrée into the realm of
securities regulation. Although state regulation was pervasive at that
time, new legislation at the federal level was deemed necessary to
protect and restore investor confidence in the wake of the stock
43
market crash of 1929. Congress expressed particular concern over
44
fraudulent activities in the securities markets.
In calling for legislative action, President Franklin D. Roosevelt
implored Congress to “add[ ] to the ancient rule of caveat emptor,
45
the further doctrine ‘let the seller also beware.’”
In response,
Congress sought to establish a regulatory framework ensuring the
exchange of reliable and honest information in the securities
39. See infra Part III.C.
40. See infra Part III.D. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (2000) provides:
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action within the
jurisdiction conferred by section 1331 of this title is joined with one or more
otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be
removed and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its
discretion, may remand all matters in which State law predominates.
41. See In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 293 B.R. 308, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(remarking that unconsolidated litigation in different fora is “duplicative and
wasteful,” that it inevitably promotes a “race” for the finite funds available for the
victims involved, and possibly deprives victims of the recovery to which they are
entitled).
42. See infra Part III.E.
43. See S. REP. NO. 73-47, at 2 (1933) (explaining that “dire national distress” after
the investment of “billions of dollars” in worthless securities demanded congressional
action); H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2 (1933) (finding that legislation was necessary in
light of the fact that half of securities offered in 1920s were worthless); see also Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 (1976) (commenting that the federal
regulation of securities transactions ensued in the wake of the stock market crash of
1929).
44. See S. REP. NO. 73-47, at 1 (remarking that the 1933 Act aimed to protect the
public from “further exploitation” by preventing the future sales of “unsound,
fraudulent, and worthless securities”); H.R. REP. NO. 73-152, at 1 (1933) (Conf. Rep.)
(describing the purpose of the 1933 Act as preventing fraudulent sales of securities
in interstate commerce); H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2 (noting the devastating
repercussions of the sale of fraudulent securities).
45. H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2.
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markets. Specifically, its primary objectives were the “full disclosure
of every essentially important element attending the issue of a new
security,” and a “demand that persons, whether they be directors,
experts, or underwriters, who sponsor the investment of other
people’s money should be held to the high standards of
47
trusteeship.”
The 1933 Act effectuated these goals by imposing a flurry of
requirements upon issuers, underwriters, and dealers to make full
48
and fair disclosures in securities offerings. The 1933 Act provides
for express private rights of action as part of its enforcement scheme.
Under Section 11 of the 1933 Act (“Section 11”), purchasers of
securities may sue for material misrepresentations or omissions in
registration statements as long as they did not know of the
49
misrepresentation or omission at the time of purchase.
The
purchaser may sue the following under Section 11: (1) any person
50
who signed the registration statement; (2) any person who was a
director or partner of the issuer at the time of the filing of the
51
registration statement; (3) any person listed in the registration
52
statement as a soon-to-be director or partner; (4) any person who
has prepared or certified any part of the registration statement, such
as accountants, engineers, appraisers, or other professionals (e.g.,
53
54
lawyers); or (5) any underwriter of the securities. Under Section
12 of the 1933 Act (“Section 12”), a purchaser of securities may sue
the offeror or seller for any material misrepresentation or omission in
55
prospectuses or oral communications.
46. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 705-06 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
47. H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 3.
48. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77g (2000) (specifying information required to be
disclosed in registration statements); id. § 77j (specifying information required to be
disclosed in prospectuses); id. § 77aa (specifying schedules of information required
in registration statements).
49. Id. § 77k.
50. The 1933 Act requires the registration statement to be signed by:
[E]ach issuer, its principal executive officer or officers, its principal financial
officer, its comptroller or principal accounting officer, and the majority of its
board of directors or persons performing similar functions (or, if there is no
board of directors or persons performing similar functions, by the majority
of the persons or board having the power of management of the issuer). . . .
Id. § 77f.
51. Id. § 77k(a)(2).
52. Id. § 77k(a)(3).
53. Id. § 77k(a)(4).
54. Id. § 77k(a)(5); see also Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386
n.22 (1983) (noting that other corporate officers, lawyers “not acting as ‘experts,’
and accountants with respect to parts of a registration statement which they are not
named as having prepared or certified” are not subject to liability under Section 11).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 77l.
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Congress based the 1933 Act in large part on pre-existing state
statutory and common law, but imposed fewer pleading requirements
56
as a form of greater investor protection from fraud. Specifically, the
1933 Act deviated from common-law fraud principles by not
57
requiring plaintiffs to prove reliance (except in one circumstance),
58
59
loss causation, or any particular state of mind of any defendant.
“This throws upon originators of securities a duty of competence as
well as innocence which the history of recent spectacular failures
60
overwhelmingly justifies.”
These special rules also reflected the
61
inferior access of purchasers to information regarding securities.
While liability under these civil liability provisions is “virtually
62
absolute” for the issuer “even for innocent misstatements,” other
defendants have a “due diligence” affirmative defense of varying
63
degrees depending on their importance in this “scheme of
56. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 711 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (noting that securities fraud was not a novel problem in 1933,
but that many States had tried to remedy it by enacting “blue sky” statutes); id.
(explaining further that when Congress addressed this issue, it “explicitly drew” from
the experience of the States).
57. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (requiring that a Section 11 plaintiff prove reliance on
alleged misrepresentation or omission only if “such person acquired the security
after the issuer has made generally available to its security holders an earning
statement covering a period of at least twelve months beginning after the effective
date of the registration statement”).
58. Plaintiffs need not prove loss causation under Sections 11 and 12. Id.
§§ 77k(e), 77l(b). Rather, defendants may assert loss causation as an affirmative
defense—namely, that a lower stock value did not result from the alleged
misrepresentations or omissions. Id.
59. See Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 382 (finding that a plaintiff who has
purchased a security pursuant to a registration statement need only show a “material
misstatement or omission” to make his prima facie case); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S.
427, 431 (1953) (finding that the 1933 Act differs greatly from common-law action by
creating a right to recover for misrepresentation where it is the seller who has the
burden of proving “lack of scienter”), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
60. H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 9 (1933); see also id. (explaining that Section 11
creates “correspondingly heavier legal liability” in line with responsibility of issuers
and securities professionals to the investing public).
61. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435 (reasoning that because issuers and securities
professionals have “better opportunities” to research and evaluate the “prospective
earnings and business plans affecting securities” than buyers, it is entirely reasonable
for Congress to place buyers of securities “covered by the [1933] Act on a different
basis from other purchasers”); Securities Act: Hearings on S. 875 Before the S. Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 207 (1933) (statement of Hon. Alexander
Holtzoff) (framing the question on who should bear the burden of liability as
follows: “Let us assume that an innocent mistake is made and an investor loses
money because of it. Now, who should suffer? The man who loses the money or the
man who puts the mistake in circulation knowing that other people will rely upon
that mistaken statement?”); H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 9 (concluding that it is necessary
to place the burden of disproving responsibility for fraudulent acts of “omission or
commission” on those who issue statements to the public).
62. Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 382.
63. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(b), 77l(a)(2).
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distribution.”
This essentially created a negligence standard for
65
these other actors.
The following year, Congress enacted the 1934 Act in order to
protect investors from fraudulent practices in securities exchanges
66
and over-the-counter markets. For example, Section 10(b) of the
1934 Act (“Section 10(b)”) makes it unlawful “[t]o use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . , any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange]
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
67
interest or for the protection of investors.” Although Congress did
not establish express civil remedies under Section 10(b), courts have
since firmly established implied private rights of action for violations
thereof and of Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Rule
68
69
10b-5 (“Rule 10b-5”), which was later promulgated in 1942.
Sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act and Section 10(b) of the 1934
Act are “interrelated components of the federal regulatory scheme
70
governing transactions in securities.” While the same conduct may
be actionable under either statute, “the two provisions involve distinct
causes of action and were intended to address different types of
71
wrongdoing.” Indeed, both Congress and the courts have defined
the contours of the implied Section 10(b) claim largely in light of
72
what is expressly provided with respect to 1933 Act claims. As a

64. H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 9.
65. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 208 (1976).
66. See S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 1-2 (1934) (responding to President Franklin
Roosevelt’s concern that “naked speculation has been made far too alluring and far
too easy for those who could and for those who could not afford to gamble. Such
speculation has run the scale from the individual who has risked his pay envelop [sic]
or his meager savings on a margin transaction involving stocks with whose true value
he was wholly unfamiliar, to the pool of individuals or corporations with large
resources, often not their own, which sought by manipulation to raise or depress
market quotations far out of line with reason, all of this resulting in loss to the
average investor, who is of necessity personally uninformed.”).
67. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
68. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004).
69. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 196 (noting that although Section 10(b)
does not on its face create an express civil remedy, nor is there any indication that
Congress intended such a remedy, the existence of a private cause of action under
the Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 is well-established (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406
U.S. 128, 150-54 (1972); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S.
6, 13 n.9 (1971))).
70. Id. at 206.
71. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 381 (1983).
72. See id. at 384 (noting the “cumulative construction of the remedies under the
1933 and 1934 Acts”).
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result, plaintiffs face a far different set of procedural and substantive
73
requirements for each cause of action.
While Sections 11 and 12 are limited to certain parties and forms
of disclosure, Section 10(b) is a “catchall” antifraud provision
applicable to “any person” having used “any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance” in connection with the purchase or
74
sale of “any security.” To provide some control over this wide range
of potential claims, courts have imposed a number of substantive
burdens on Section 10(b) plaintiffs, including a scienter and loss
75
causation requirement.
While lacking these substantive
requirements, “each of the express civil remedies in the 1933 Act
allowing recovery for negligent conduct is subject to significant
76
procedural restrictions not applicable under § 10(b).” Specifically,
unlike their Section 10(b) counterparts, Section 11 and 12 plaintiffs
must post security for costs and satisfy an express statute of
77
limitations. These unique features of 1933 Act and 1934 Act claims
78
For example, without the
serve to counterbalance each other.
substantive requirements read into Section 10(b) claims, plaintiffs
could just proceed thereunder and avoid the 1933 Act procedural
requirements, “thereby nullify[ing] the effectiveness of the carefully
79
drawn procedural restrictions on these express actions.”
73. See SEC v. Nat’l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 466 (1969) (recognizing an
“interdependence of the various sections of the securities laws” but reaffirming that
even particular phrases may have different meanings between the 1933 and 1934
Acts).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004). See Herman &
MacLean, 459 U.S. at 382 (describing plaintiff’s burden under Section 10(b)).
75. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 125 S. Ct. 1627, 1633 (2005) (stating that
plaintiffs are required to prove that their economic loss was proximately caused by
the defendant’s misrepresentation or fraud for all Section 10(b) claims); Ernst &
Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193 (holding that an allegation of “scienter” intent to deceive,
defraud or manipulate is required for Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 private actions for
damages).
76. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 208-09 (citations omitted).
77. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(e), 77m. Congress added these requirements just one
year after enacting the 1933 Act to deter actions being brought solely for settlement
value. See 78 CONG. REC. 8668 (1934) (statement of Sen. Fletcher) (noting criticisms
that the 1933 Act “is too drastic, and is interfering with business. We have tried to
meet those objections by this amendment”); id. at 8669 (statement of Sen. Fletcher)
(emphasizing that amendments to Section 11 of the 1933 Act served as “a defense
against blackmail suits as well as a defense against purely contentious litigation on
the part of the defendant”); 78 CONG. REC. 10185 (1934) (statement of Sen. Byrnes)
(arguing that “[t]here can be no doubt that the provisions of the existing law caused
many men who were serving as directors of corporations to fear that they might be
subjected to so-called ‘strike suits’ as the result of the administration of that law”).
78. Indeed, the bond requirement and express statute of limitations in the 1933
Act were enacted in conjunction with the 1934 Act. See Pub. L. No. 73-291, §§ 206,
207, 48 Stat. 881, 907-08 (1934).
79. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 210.
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Most relevant to this Article, 1933 Act and 1934 Act claims also
differ in terms of their respective jurisdictional provisions. Section 22
of the 1933 Act provides that federal courts and state courts have
concurrent jurisdiction over any private cause of action under the
80
1933 Act.
However, “no case arising under [the 1933 Act] and
brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction shall be
81
removed to any court of the United States.” Conversely, Congress
expressly provided for exclusive federal jurisdiction of claims brought
82
under the 1934 Act.
As numerous commentators have noted, there is little—if any—
legislative history underlying the non-removal provision of the 1933
83
Act. The grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction for 1934 Act claims
84
just one year later casts an even darker shadow. Indeed, in 1934,
Congress acknowledged the conflict between the non-removal

80. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a). The jurisdictional provisions of the 1933 Act also apply to
the Trust Indenture Act of 1939. Id. § 77vvv(b).
81. Id. § 77v(a).
82. See id. § 78aa (stating that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over
violations of the 1934 Act). Federal courts also have exclusive jurisdiction over SEC
actions for breach of fiduciary duty under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. Id.
§ 80a-35. Other federal securities laws have hybrid jurisdictional provisions of
concurrent jurisdiction with no limitations on removal to federal court. See Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79y; Investment Company Act of
1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-43; Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14.
83. See, e.g., Allan Horwich, Section 11 of the Securities Act: The Cornerstone Needs
Some Tuckpointing, 58 BUS. LAW. 1, 40 n.241 (2002), citing Paul Horton, Section 17(a)
of the 1933 Securities Act—The Wrong Place for a Private Right, 68 NW. U. L. REV. 44, 56
n.32 (1973) (noting the lack of legislative history explaining Section 22 of the
Securities Act).
84. The grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction was heavily debated in Congress.
See, e.g., 78 CONG. REC. 8099, 8571 (1934). However, the legislative history is silent as
to the reason for the grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction. See Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 383 (1996) (“The legislative history of the
[1934] Act elucidates no specific purpose on the part of Congress in enacting [the
exclusive federal jurisdiction provision].”). Courts have been left to infer that the
purpose of this provision was “to achieve greater uniformity of construction and
more effective and expert application of that law.” Id. (quoting Murphy v. Gallagher,
761 F.2d 878, 885 (2d Cir. 1985)). Some commentators have suggested that
Congress granted exclusive federal jurisdiction in order to safeguard express actions
under the 1934 Act with heavy burdens on plaintiffs or of a highly technical nature
with no basis in state common law. See Margaret V. Sachs, Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction
for Implied Rule 10b-5 Actions: The Emperor Has No Clothes, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 559, 580-81
(1988) (arguing that the heavy burden of proof required by sections 9(e) and 18(a)
of the 1934 Act may have caused Congress to grant exclusive jurisdiction to federal
courts under the assumption that these courts would be sensitive to underlying
federal policies and could provide investors with a viable remedy); Louis Loss, The
SEC Proxy Rules and State Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1249, 1275 (1960) (“The 1934 act is
considerably more technical, and contains some provisions . . . which go much
further beyond the common law than anything in the 1933 act. The logical
inference from these Delphic indications is that the exclusive-federal-jurisdiction
provision in the 1934 act was motivated by a desire to achieve a greater uniformity of
construction, and perhaps a more sympathetic judicial approach . . . .”).
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provision of the 1933 Act and the exclusive federal jurisdiction
85
provision of the 1934 Act, and even considered an amendment to
86
grant exclusive federal jurisdiction over 1933 Act claims. However,
Congress did not amend the non-removal provision of the 1933 Act at
87
that time. “So far as the legislative history shows, the difference in
88
these two related statutes is pure happenstance.”
It is surprising that Congress would have been silent in its
legislative history when taking the unconventional measure of
preventing the removal of federal law claims to federal court.
Indeed, that provision of the 1933 Act is in a rather exclusive club of
89
federal non-removal provisions.
Despite their substantive
dissimilarities, these similarly unique provisions, for which there are
indications of legislative intent, may shed light on the rationale
behind the non-removal provision of the 1933 Act.
Courts have generally noted that such “allocations of jurisdiction
have been carefully wrought to the realities of power and interest and
90
national policy.” One such “reality” is a “complementary, historic
interacting federal-state relationship” over a particular subject, with
state authority not to be disturbed by removal of related actions to
91
federal court.
Other interests served in federal non-removal
92
provisions include reducing the burdens on federal courts,
85. See 78 CONG. REC. 8571 (1934) (statement of Sen. Byrnes) (noting that the
Senate version of the bill is identical to the 1933 Act in terms of jurisdiction, but that
in contrast, the House bill gives exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts).
86. See id. at 8717 (statement of James Landis) (noting that the proposed
amendment would eliminate concurrent jurisdiction of federal and state courts for
the enforcement of the 1933 Act).
87. As discussed infra, the non-removal provision of the 1933 Act remained
unchanged until 1998. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998
§ 101(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77v (2000) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 77v by adding “[e]xcept
as provided in Section 77p(c) of this title”).
88. A.L.I., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS 183 (1969).
89. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 3612 (2000) (claims under the Condominium and
Cooperative Abuse Relief Act of 1980); 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2000) (admiralty actions
under the “saving to suitors” clause); id. § 1445(a) (actions under the Federal
Employers Liability Act); id. § 1445(b) (certain actions against common carriers
under the Interstate Commerce Act); id. § 1445(c) (actions arising under state
worker’s compensation laws); id. § 1445(d) (actions arising under the Violence
Against Women Act); 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a) (2000) (actions arising under the Jones
Act); 46 U.S.C. § 761 (2000) (actions under the Death on the High Seas Act).
90. Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 375 (1959).
91. See id. at 372 (noting that the “unquestioned aim” of the “saving to suitors”
clause’s prohibition of removal of certain admiralty matters was to prevent
“considerable inroads into the traditionally exercised concurrent jurisdiction of the
state courts in admiralty matters”); Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348
U.S. 310, 313 (1955) (explaining that the federal government has left significant
regulatory power with the states, especially in the fields of maritime contracts and
torts).
92. See, e.g., Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., The Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence
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93

preserving a plaintiff’s choice of forum, and preventing the
94
Applying these
“federalization” of traditional areas of state law.
rationales to the 1933 Act and its overall pro-plaintiff nature, one
court concluded that the non-removal provision of the 1933 Act, “like
others of the same genre, has the evident purpose of favoring
95
plaintiffs’ choice of forum.”
B. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
Private rights of action under the federal securities laws remained
mostly untouched for decades, until Congress embarked on a series
96
of securities legislation in 1995 with the passage of the PSLRA. This
legislation was heralded as “the most momentous event in the history
of securities regulation since the adoption of the Securities Acts in
97
1933 and 1934,” and was intended to curb abuses in private
98
securities litigation. Securities fraud actions were the main culprit.
“These suits, which unnecessarily increase the cost of raising capital
and chill corporate disclosure, are often based on nothing more than
99
a company’s announcement of bad news, not evidence of fraud.” As
Against Women Act: A Defense, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 26 (2000) (recognizing
concerns at both the state and federal level that the creation of a civil rights remedy
in the Violence Against Women Act would unnecessarily burden the courts); Horton
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 351 (1961) (noting that Section 1445(c)
reflects congressional concern for congestion in federal courts); S. REP. NO. 85-1830,
at 9 (1958), as reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3105-06 (justifying the prohibition
on removing workman’s compensation claims to federal courts under Section
1445(c) because such a prohibition would help alleviate the burden on the federal
courts).
93. See Horton, 367 U.S. at 351-52 (noting congressional concern for heavier trial
burdens on worker’s compensation plaintiffs in federal court); S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at
9, as reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3106 (stating that Section 1445(c) intended
to preserve worker’s compensation plaintiffs’ choice to avail themselves of
procedural advantages of proceeding in state court the non-removal provision gives
the plaintiff the option of filing his claim in state or federal court).
94. See Biden, supra note 92, at 26 (noting, for instance, that Section 1445(d) was
enacted to prevent federalization of domestic relations law); S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at
3106 (noting that worker’s compensation cases exist only by virtue of state law and
involve no federal question).
95. Pinto v. Maremont Corp., 326 F. Supp. 165, 167 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (stating
that federal non-removal provisions apply to “tort actions in which Congress wishes
to give the plaintiff an absolute choice of forum” (citing WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS
§ 38 n.28 (2d ed.))).
96. Brian S. Sommer, The PSLRA Decade of Decadence: Improving Balance in the
Private Securities Arena with a Screening Approach, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 413 (2005) (noting
that the PSLRA brought sweeping changes to the procedural rules for securities
claims).
97. Harold S. Bloomenthal, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act—How Safe Is
the Safe Harbor?, SEC. & FED. CORP. L. REP., Jan. 1996, at 1.
98. See generally S. REP. NO. 104-98 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679;
H.R. REP. NO. 104-369 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730.
99. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 4, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683; see also id.
at 692 (strengthening Rule 11 sanctions to reduce any incentive to file frivolous
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in the 1930s, the protection of investors was again touted as the
impetus for legislative action—but this time from lawyers acting
100
“Investors
purportedly on their behalf in filing meritless lawsuits.
always are the ultimate losers when extortionate ‘settlements’ are
101
extracted from issuers.”
The PSLRA made significant changes to private causes of action
under the 1933 Act and, even more significantly, the 1934 Act. First,
the PSLRA added a safe-harbor provision to both the 1933 Act and
102
1934 Act for “forward-looking statements.”
Plaintiffs now must
allege that a defendant made a forward-looking statement with actual
knowledge of its falsity—even under the “strict liability” provisions of
103
the 1933 Act for which no showing of scienter is otherwise required.
The PSLRA also contained a number of procedural amendments
to class actions under both the 1933 Act and 1934 Act. Securities
class actions now require the appointment of the “most adequate
plaintiff,” which is presumed to be the investor with the “largest
104
This measure
financial interest in the relief sought by the class.”
served to protect the class from its own lawyers, as “courts could be
more confident settlements negotiated under the supervision of
institutional plaintiffs were ‘fair and reasonable’ than is the case with
105
settlements negotiated by unsupervised plaintiffs’ attorneys.”
The PSLRA also mandated a stay of discovery while a motion to
dismiss is pending—absent the need to preserve evidence or prevent
106
undue prejudice—to reduce the costs of meritless actions.
The
PSLRA also required stricter application of Rule 11 of the Federal
107
Rules of Civil Procedure for the imposition of sanctions in order to
“reduce significantly the economic incentive [of plaintiffs’ lawyers] to
file meritless lawsuits without hindering the ability of the victims of
108
fraud to pursue legitimate claims.”
Given the focus on abuses in securities fraud litigation, the PSLRA
also contained amendments unique to fraud claims under the 1934
Act. The PSLRA imposed heightened pleading requirements on

lawsuits while allowing victims of fraud to pursue their legitimate claims).
100. See id. at 685 (noting that the legislation was designed to encourage the
pursuit of valid securities fraud claims by plaintiffs’ lawyers and to promote the fight
of abusive claims by defendants).
101. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 32, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731.
102. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(c)(1)(A), 78u-5(c)(1)(A) (2000).
103. Id. §§ 77z-2(b), 78u-5(b).
104. Id. §§ 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I), 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I).
105. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 11, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690.
106. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(b), 78u-4(b)(3).
107. Id. §§ 77z-1(c)(1), 78u-4(c)(1).
108. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 13, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 692.

COOK.OFFTOPRINTER

636

2/22/2006 2:34:45 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:621

securities fraud claims under the 1934 Act consistent with a
“stringent” reading of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
109
Specifically, 1934 Act plaintiffs must “specify each
Procedure.
statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why
the statement is misleading, and if an allegation regarding the
statement or omission is made on information and belief, the
complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which that belief is
110
formed.”
Plaintiffs must also “state with particularity facts giving
rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required
111
state of mind.”
Where a plaintiff fails to meet either of these
heightened pleading requirements, a court “shall” grant a motion to
112
dismiss the 1934 Act claim.
C. The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998
The PSLRA did not modify the jurisdictional provisions of the
federal securities laws, including the non-removal provision of the
1933 Act. As a result, plaintiffs’ lawyers—the PSLRA’s main target—
113
could still file either 1933 Act claims or state law claims in state
court in order to sidestep the new pleading and procedural
114
requirements.
Despite inconclusive evidence as to the actual
115
exploitation of this loophole, Congress passed SLUSA in order to
109. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 41 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740. Rule 9(b) requires that “all averments of fraud and
mistake . . . shall be stated with particularity.” FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
110. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1).
111. Id. § 78u-4(b)(2).
112. Id. § 78u-4(b)(3)(A).
113. As described supra, state courts have concurrent jurisdiction only over 1933
Act claims, not 1934 Act claims. Moreover, it is unclear to what extent the PSLRA’s
procedural requirements apply to 1933 Act claims brought in state court, as many
apply only to class actions filed “pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”
Id. §§ 77z-1(a), 78u-4(a); see also Nicholas E. Chimicles, The Future of Securities
Litigation Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, SA90 ALI-ABA 465,
477 (1996) (noting that “[t]he [PSLRA]’s procedural changes only apply to cases
brought in Federal court”). Compare id. §§ 77z-1(c)(1), 78u-4(c)(1) (requiring court
findings of compliance “with each requirement of Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure”), with id. §§ 77z-1(b), 78u-4(b)(3) (applying to “any private action
arising under this subchapter”).
114. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 14-15 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (noting that “since
passage of the [PSLRA], plaintiffs’ lawyers have sought to circumvent the [PSLRA]’s
provisions by exploiting differences between Federal and State laws by filing frivolous
and speculative lawsuits in State court, where essentially none of the [PSLRA]’s
procedural or substantive protections against abusive suits are available”); S. REP. NO.
105-182, at 1 (1998); see also Perino, supra note 17, at 1046 (noting “a significant shift
of activity from federal to state court in an apparent attempt by plaintiffs to avoid the
procedural and substantive hurdles Congress created when it passed the [PSLRA]”).
115. Compare Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State
Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273, 302 (1998) (finding “a
significant shift in litigation from federal to state court” despite lack of “attempt[ ] to
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curb such forum selection and promote national standards for
116
securities traded on national exchanges.
The target again was the plaintiffs’ bar: “[W]e are here tonight to
perfect [the PSLRA], to say you cannot use the State courts to do the
same illicit, abusive strike suits that you were formerly doing in
117
Federal court.”
Actions “alleging fraud” were again seen as the
118
main conduit for abusive litigation.
Moreover, given that strike
suits were primarily brought as securities fraud class actions for
maximum effect, Congress did not change the treatment of
119
individual lawsuits.
In an attempt to close this jurisdictional loophole, SLUSA added
Section 77p(c) and 78bb(f) to the 1933 Act and 1934 Act,
respectively, which provide: “Any covered class action brought in any
State court involving a covered security, as set forth in subsection (b)
of this section, shall be removable to the Federal district court for the
district in which the action is pending, and shall be subject to
120
subsection (b) of this section.” In turn, “subsection (b)” provides:
No covered class action based upon the statutory or common law of
any State or subdivision thereof may be maintained in any State or
Federal court by any private party alleging—(1) an untrue
statement or omission of a material fact in connection with the
purchase or sale of a covered security; or (2) that the defendant
used or employed any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered
121
security.

quantify pre-[PSLRA] levels of state court activity in order to measure the exact size
of this shift”), with Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption
of State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 42-45 (1998) (reviewing
research on statistical data involving state court claims made after passage of the
PSLRA and noting that the data did not provide strong evidence of filings in state
court to avoid the PSLRA’s requirements).
116. 143 CONG. REC. S10477 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1997) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
117. 144 CONG. REC. H6058 (daily ed. July 21, 1998) (statement of Rep. Tauzin);
see also 144 CONG. REC. S12445 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1998) (statement of Sen. D’Amato)
(“[W]e should not condone little more than a judicially sanctioned shakedown that
only benefits strike lawyers.”); 144 CONG. REC. H6059-60 (daily ed. July 21, 1998)
(statement of Rep. Cox) (“The stockholders here are being taken advantage of by
lawyers who bring lawsuits for their own benefit, and that is what the [PSLRA] was all
about.”); id. at H6063 (statement of Rep. Oxley) (commenting that “shareholders
and employees lose every time that the company has to pay off a passel of lawyers just
to settle”).
118. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, § 2
¶ 5, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
119. H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 2; see also S. REP. NO. 105-182, at 6 (noting that
individual state actions would not be affected by SLUSA).
120. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(c), 78bb(f)(2)(2000).
121. Id. §§ 77p(b), 78bb(f)(3).

COOK.OFFTOPRINTER

638

2/22/2006 2:34:45 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:621

SLUSA amended the non-removal provision of the 1933 Act by
122
adding the exception “as provided in section 77p(c) of this title.”
This amendment is hardly a model of clarity. Combining the crossreferenced provisions, the 1933 Act now permits removal of class
actions based on the statutory or common law of a state involving a
123
covered security.
By the plain language of these provisions,
Congress appears to have reached the anomalous result of
authorizing the removal and preemption of state law claims, while
keeping federal 1933 Act claims in state court.
The legislative history provides no clear guidance on the
parameters of SLUSA’s amendment to the non-removal provision of
the 1933 Act. The amendment was at least inartfully—or, given the
repeated statements of intent to the contrary, perhaps mistakenly—
drafted. For example, despite a slew of references to state versus
124
federal courts as the relevant demarcation in the legislative history,
the express rationale of SLUSA ended up being “to limit the conduct
125
of securities class actions under State law, and for other purposes.”
While making federal courts the exclusive forum for all claims
involving national securities might have been the intent of Congress,
the end result was another loophole: this time, permitting the filing
of 1933 Act claims in state court seeking recovery on the same
122. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 § 101(a)(3), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77v(a).
123. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(b), 77p(c), 77v(a).
124. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 13 (stating that the purpose of SLUSA is to
prevent plaintiffs from evading federal protections against abusive litigation by filing
claims in state, rather than federal, court); id. (“Under [SLUSA], class actions
relating to a ‘covered security’ . . . alleging fraud or manipulation must be
maintained pursuant to the provisions of Federal securities law, in Federal court
(subject to certain exceptions).”); H.R. REP. NO. 105-640, at 8-9 (1998) (same); 144
CONG. REC. H10779 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1998) (statement of Rep. Oxley) (“The
conference report prevents lawyers from evading the protections of the [PSLRA] by
filing their lawsuit in State court.”); id. at H10780 (statement of Rep. Eshoo)
(commenting that SLUSA is intended to “assur[e] that lawsuits involving nationally
traded securities remain in Federal courts where they have always been heard”); id. at
H10771 (statement of Rep. Bliley) (“This legislation we are considering today will
eliminate State court as a venue for meritless securities litigation . . . . The premise of
this legislation is simple: lawsuits alleging violations that involve securities that are
offered nationally belong in Federal court.”); 144 CONG. REC. H6060 (daily ed. July
21, 1998) (statement of Rep. Cox) (“[T]his legislation will make federal courts the
exclusive venue for large-scale securities fraud lawsuits . . .”); 143 CONG. REC. S10475
(daily ed. Oct. 7, 1997) (statement of Sen. Gramm) (“[I]f a stock is traded on the
national market, . . . then the class-action suit has to be filed in federal court.”). This
confusion was also apparently shared by then-SEC Commissioner Arthur Levitt. See
144 CONG. REC. S12444-45 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1998) (letter from Arthur Levitt to
Senators D’Amato, Gramm, Dodd) (stating that “the bill generally provides that class
actions can be brought only in federal court where they will be governed by federal
law”).
125. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Introductory Statement
(emphasis added).
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allegations of fraud as 1934 Act claims subject to the heightened
pleading requirements of the PSLRA.
D. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
Whereas the latter half of the 1990s was marked by corporate—and
investor—prosperity, the new millennium commenced with a severe
downturn in the stock market and the revelation of massive, multibillion-dollar corporate frauds. Congress reacted to fraud scandals
such as Enron and WorldCom with the swift passage of the SarbanesOxley Act in 2002. As with the securities legislation in both the 1930s
and 1990s, fraud was the primary impetus for the enactment of the
126
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
This time, however, the tides of investor
protection had turned. The investing public now had to be protected
not from lawyers filing fraud actions on their behalf (as with the
PSLRA and SLUSA), but (as with the 1933 Act and 1934 Act) from
issuers and their directors, officers, and agents committing the frauds
127
in the first place.
The scope of Congress’s reaction matched that of the frauds being
targeted, with amendments scattered among many titles of the
United States Code. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act added a number of new
disclosure and certification requirements to the regulatory
framework of the federal securities laws. Specifically, the chief
executive and financial officers of the issuer must now certify that
each periodic report “fully complies with the requirements of section
13(a) or 15(d) of the [1934 Act] and that information contained in
the periodic report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
128
financial condition and results of operations of the issuer.”
Congress added teeth to these disclosure requirements in the form of
hefty criminal penalties—up to $5,000,000 and 20 years

126. See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 2 (2002) (“This bill contains a number of
provisions intended to increase the criminal penalties for serious fraud, ensure that
evidence—both physical and testimonial—is preserved and available in fraud cases,
provide prosecutors with the tools they need to prosecute those who commit
securities fraud, and make sure that victims of securities fraud have a fair chance to
pursue their claims and recoup their losses.”); 148 CONG. REC. S6526 (daily ed. July
10, 2002) (statement of Sen. McConnell) (noting “today’s stories of corporate fraud,
deception, and outright theft that we all cite as the real motivation behind the
underlying bill”).
127. See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 2 (“This bill would play a crucial role in restoring
trust in the financial markets by ensuring that the corporate fraud and greed may be
better detected, prevented and prosecuted.”); id. at 17 (extending limitations period
for claims involving fraud as not to “unfairly limit recovery for defrauded investors”).
128. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 906(a), 18 U.S.C.A. § 1350(b) (Supp. II 2002)
(citation omitted).
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129

imprisonment for willful violations.
Congress also established new
130
131
federal crimes for obstruction of justice and securities fraud,
132
and either
increased the penalties for some existing crimes,
directed or requested review of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
133
for other crimes.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s focus on fraud is made clear by its only
134
reform to private rights of action —an extended limitations period
135
as further protection to victims of fraud. The 1933 Act contains an
136
express limitations period for Section 11 and 12 claims, while the
Supreme Court transposed the one-year/three-year limitations period
found elsewhere in the 1934 Act upon the implied rights of action
137
under Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5.
Congress heeded the warning
129. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1350(c)(2).
130. Id. §§ 1512, 1519, 1520(b).
131. See id. §§ 1348, 1349 (codifying crimes of conspiracy and attempt to commit
securities fraud).
132. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ff(a) (West 2002) (criminal violations of the 1934 Act); 18
U.S.C.A. § 1341 (mail fraud); id. § 1343 (wire fraud); 29 U.S.C.A. § 1131 (West 2002)
(ERISA).
133. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 805 (directing the United States Sentencing
Commission to review and amend the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for obstruction
of justice and extensive criminal fraud); id. § 905 (directing review of sentencing
guidelines relating to certain white-collar offenses); id. § 1104 (requesting review of
sentencing guidelines for securities and accounting fraud).
134. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1658(b) (West 2005) (establishing a statute of limitations of
two years after the discovery of a violation or five years after a violation, whichever is
earlier). Given the few protections afforded investors under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
with respect to private rights of action, the Shareholder and Employee Rights
Restoration Act of 2003 was introduced in the House of Representatives “[t]o repeal
the provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act that limit private securities actions . . . .” H.R. 636,
108th Cong. (2003). This bill would have repealed SLUSA’s amendment to the nonremoval provision of the 1933 Act. Id. § 2(c)(2). However, the last action taken on
the bill was its reference to the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and
Intellectual Property of the House Judiciary Committee in March 2003. See Thomas,
The Library of Congress, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?d108:636:./list
/bss/d108HR.lst:@@@X|TOM:/bss/108search.html| (last visited Nov. 19, 2005)
(listing all actions taken on this bill).
135. See 148 CONG. REC. S1787 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
(arguing “[i]t is time that the law be changed to give victims the time they need to
prove their fraud cases.”).
136. See 15 U.S.C. § 77m (2000) (providing that “[n]o action shall be maintained
to enforce any liability created under section 77k or 77l(a)(2) of this title unless
brought within one year after the discovery of the untrue statement or the omission,
or after such discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable
diligence, or, if the action is to enforce a liability created under section 77l(a)(1) of
this title, unless brought within one year after the violation upon which it is based.
In no event shall any such action be brought to enforce a liability created under
section 77k or 77l(a)(1) of this title more than three years after the security was bona
fide offered to the public, or under section 77l(a)(2) of this title more than three
years after the sale.”).
137. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 364
(1991) (holding that claims under Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 are subject to the
statute of limitations in Section 9(e) of the 1934 Act). Section 9(e) of the 1934 Act

COOK.OFFTOPRINTER

2006]

2/22/2006 2:34:45 PM

RECRAFTING THE JURISDICTIONAL FRAMEWORK

641

that, while the Court had adopted a limitations period for fraud
claims from strict liability provisions of the 1934 Act, “[t]he most
extensive and corrupt schemes may not be discovered within the time
allowed for bringing an express cause of action under the 1934
138
Act.”
Entitled “Statute of Limitations for Securities Fraud,” Section 804
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act created a new express limitations period
applicable not to claims under any particular statute, but to any
“private right of action that involves a claim of fraud . . . concerning
139
the securities laws.” Such claims “may be brought not later than the
earlier of—(1) 2 years after the discovery of the facts constituting the
140
violation; or (2) 5 years after such violation.” Congress did not add
this new limitations provision to the 1933 Act or 1934 Act, or
elsewhere under Title 15, but to the catch-all limitations period for
141
federal statutes under Title 28.
That statutory placement suggests
that Congress intended to protect plaintiffs of a certain substantive
type (i.e., fraud victims), rather than plaintiffs asserting claims under
any particular statutory provision.
142
Section 804 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is riddled with ambiguity.
First, there is no indication how this provision interrelates with (i.e.,
supersedes) any of the express limitations provisions elsewhere in the
143
1933 Act and 1934 Act.
Moreover, Section 804 of the SarbanesOxley Act provides no definition of the term “private right of action
that involves a claim of fraud” and makes no reference to any
particular federal statutes under which such private right of action
144
may arise.
Regardless, courts thus far have agreed that this
provides: “No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under this
section, unless brought within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting
the violation and within three years after such violation.” 15 U.S.C. § 78(i)(e).
138. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 377 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
139. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1658(b) (West 2005). The term “securities laws” includes both
the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(47). Id.
140. Id.
141. See id. § 1658 (providing for “[t]ime limitations on the commencement of
civil actions arising under Acts of Congress”).
142. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act—Section 804 in particular—has been widely
criticized for being hastily and poorly drafted. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., A Brief
Tour of the Major Reforms in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, SH097 ALI-ABA 151, 171-72 (2002)
(arguing that because the Act was passed quickly and many of the important
provisions were added by floor amendments and without hearings, it is not surprising
that it contains ambiguities and has had some unintended consequences).
143. See Michael A. Perino, Enron’s Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the
Deterrence Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 671, 693 (2002)
(arguing that Section 804 is “poorly drafted” for being “inconsistent with express
statutes of limitation already contained in the federal securities laws and is likely to
create significant interpretational difficulties for courts”).
144. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1658(b).
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extended limitations period applies to Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5
145
No court has yet found this extended limitations period
claims.
146
However, this unanimity is
applicable to 1933 Act claims.
misleading given that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been interpreted
147
only with respect to 1933 Act claims of a certain nature.
E. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
Class action litigation reform had been simmering in Congress in
148
recent years, culminating in the recent enactment of CAFA in
149
As it had recently attempted to achieve in the
February 2005.
securities arena with SLUSA, Congress targeted forum shopping in
the filing of class action lawsuits of all substantive sorts in state
150
courts.
Congress found it particularly troubling that “certain
favored judges” in state courts were “hearing nationwide cases and
151
setting policy for the entire country,” with “an almost ‘anything
goes’ approach that remedies virtually any controversy subject to
152
certification as a class action.”
Like SLUSA, CAFA handicaps plaintiffs because of the
153
One noted maneuver was
jurisdictional tactics of their lawyers.
145. See, e.g., In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 351 F. Supp. 2d 334, 365
n.16 (D. Md. 2004) (noting that Section 804 “applies to claims which are
fraud-based, such as § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims”); Nw. Human Servs., Inc. v.
Panaccio, No. Civ.A. 03-157, 2004 WL 2166293, at *18 n.72 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2004)
(stating that “[s]ection 804 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 extended section
10(b)’s statute of limitations and repose from the one-year/three-year period
outlined in Lampf to a two-year/five-year period”).
146. See infra note 321 and accompanying text.
147. See infra note 322 and accompanying text (noting that these holdings only
pertain to claims that do not allege fraud).
148. See H.R. 3789, 105th Cong. (1998) (introducing the Class Action Jurisdiction
Act of 1998). The Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1998 sought class action reform of
the sort eventually enacted in the form of CAFA. Similar reforms were reintroduced
multiple times in subsequent sessions of Congress. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 106-320
(1999) (proposing the Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999); S. REP. No.
106-420 (2000) (introducing the Class Action Fairness Act of 2000); S. REP. No. 108123 (2003) (discussing the Class Action Fairness Act of 2003).
149. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.).
150. See 151 CONG. REC. S1076 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen. Specter)
(explaining that “[t]he class action bill has as its central focus to prevent judge
shopping to various States and even counties where courts and judges have a
prejudicial predisposition on cases.”); id. at S1081 (statement of Sen. Lott)
(addressing “a dramatic rise in the number of interstate class actions being filed in
State courts, particularly in what are called magnet jurisdictions”); 151 CONG. REC.
H748 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep. Blunt) (arguing that “[l]awyers
who now manipulate this system often do anything to stay out of Federal court”).
151. 151 CONG. REC. H726 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner).
152. Id. at H727 (statement of Rep. Boucher).
153. See id. at H726 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (targeting “aggressive
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preventing removal of class actions by bringing only state law claims
and artfully pleading around the requirements for diversity
154
That is, plaintiffs’ lawyers would name parties of
jurisdiction.
certain state citizenship to destroy complete diversity and/or seek less
than the requisite amount-in-controversy for any one plaintiff in
155
order to remain in state court.
Accordingly, CAFA expanded diversity jurisdiction—the original
156
tool against local favoritism in state courts—over class actions.
Echoing SLUSA, the goal was to allow class actions of a “truly
157
national” nature to be heard in federal court.
Congress extended
158
CAFA to “mass actions” which class action lawyers might have
159
otherwise filed to sidestep the new jurisdictional provisions.
forum shopping by trial lawyers to find courts and judges who will act as willing
accomplices in a judicial power grab”); id. at H729 (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner) (stating that legislative action is an “attempt to put an end to the
type of gaming engaged in by plaintiffs’ lawyers to keep cases in state court”); id. at
H735 (statement of Rep. Keller) (noting that “crafty lawyers are able to game the
system by filing large, nationwide class action suits in certain preferred State courts”);
151 CONG. REC. S1084 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen. Cornyn) (noting
class action abuses by “a handful of aggressive personal injury lawyers to pursue
abusive litigation and junk lawsuits”).
154. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000) (providing that federal courts have
jurisdiction over suits between parties of diverse citizenship with in excess of $75,000
in controversy).
155. See 151 CONG. REC. S1079 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen. Dodd)
(“[P]laintiffs’ lawyers have been able to keep class actions out of Federal court, even
those that are precisely the kind of cases for which diversity jurisdiction was created,
because of their interstate character. They do this by adding named plaintiffs or
defendants solely based on their State of citizenship in order to defeat the diversity
requirement. Alternatively, they allege an amount in controversy that does not
trigger the $75,000 threshold for removing cases to Federal court. The result is
frequently an absurd one. A slip-and-fall case in which a plaintiff alleges, say, $76,000
in damages can end up in Federal court. At the same time, a case involving millions
of plaintiffs from multiple States and billions of dollars in alleged damages is heard
in State court, just because no plaintiff claims more than $75,000 in damages or
because at least one defendant is from the same State of at least one plaintiff.”).
156. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 2(b)(2) (providing that the purpose of
CAFA is to “restore the intent of the framers of the United States Constitution by
providing for Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national importance
under diversity jurisdiction”).
157. 151 CONG. REC. S1077 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen. McConnell)
(noting that legislation would still allow local controversies to be heard in state
courts).
158. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 4(a)(2), 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) (defining a “mass action” for purposes of CAFA as “any civil
action . . . in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be
tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions of
law or fact,” as long as such joinder is not proposed by defendants or solely for
purposes of pretrial proceedings).
159. See id. § 1332(d)(11)(A) (providing that “a mass action shall be deemed to be
a [removable] class action”); see also 151 CONG. REC. S1082 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005)
(statement of Sen. Lott) (explaining that the mass action provision “will ensure that
class action-like cases are covered by the bill’s jurisdictional provisions even if the
cases are not pleaded as class actions”); 151 CONG. REC. H732 (daily ed. Feb. 17,
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Indeed, Congress had adopted a similar loophole-closing measure in
SLUSA in defining “covered class actions” to cover more than
160
traditional class actions.
As a result, federal courts now have diversity jurisdiction over a
class action or mass action if the amount in controversy alleged by all
plaintiffs collectively exceeds $5,000,000 and any member of the
plaintiff class is a citizen of a foreign state or a different state from
161
any defendant. However, to allow “primarily intrastate actions that
162
lack national implications” to remain in state court, CAFA exempts
from this jurisdictional reach cases in which at least two-thirds of the
plaintiff class and primary defendants are citizens of the state in
163
which the action is filed.
In addition, CAFA accords federal courts the discretion to decline
jurisdiction “in the interests of justice” where the local or national
164
nature of the case is less obvious. Specifically, if greater than onethird but fewer than two-thirds of the plaintiff class and primary
defendants are citizens of the state in which the action is filed, the
federal court may decline to exercise jurisdiction based on six factors:
(1) whether the suit presents issues of significant national or
interstate interest; (2) whether the claims will be governed by laws
other than those of the forum state; (3) whether the case has been
pleaded so as to avoid federal jurisdiction; (4) whether there is a
“distinct” nexus between the state forum and the plaintiff class, the
alleged harm, or the defendants; (5) whether the citizenship of the
members of the proposed plaintiff class is widely dispersed among
states and higher in the forum state than any other single state; and
(6) whether other similar class actions have been recently filed to
165
allow for coordination of parallel actions.
This last factor is to be

2005) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (characterizing “mass actions” as “class
actions in disguise . . . result[ing] in the same abuses as class actions”); id. at H729
(statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (noting that a mass action “will be treated as a
class action for jurisdictional purposes”).
160. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 § 101(a)(1), (b)(1), 15
U.S.C. §§ 77p(f)(2)(A)(ii), 78bb(f)(5)(B)(ii) (2000) (defining “covered class
actions” as not only actions brought on behalf of a plaintiff class, but also “any group
of lawsuits filed in or pending in the same court and involving common questions of
law or fact, in which—(I) damages are sought on behalf of more than 50 persons;
and (II) the lawsuits are joined, consolidated, or otherwise proceed as a single action
for any purpose”).
161. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(2).
162. 151 CONG. REC. S1079 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
163. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(4)(B).
164. Id. § 1332(d)(3).
165. Id.
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broadly interpreted so that plaintiffs cannot “plead around it with
166
creative legal theories” to avoid jurisdiction.
Securities class actions are expressly addressed in CAFA—but only
167
to be exempted therefrom.
The massive corporate frauds
underpinning the Sarbanes-Oxley Act were often invoked by
opponents to CAFA as evidence that plaintiffs needed more—or at
168
least not less—protection in the class action context. This was met
with reassurance from CAFA’s proponents that securities fraud was
169
expressly exempted from the legislation.
Notably, however, this carve-out for securities class actions was part
of the original class action reform proposals predating the stock
market downturn in 2000 and the massive frauds of the likes of
170
Enron and WorldCom. Therefore, the purpose of the securities
exception in CAFA appears not primarily to have been for the
protection of investors from securities fraud. Rather, its intent was to
preserve the “carefully crafted” jurisdictional framework over
171
securities claims established in SLUSA.
Indeed, the desire to
166. 151 CONG. REC. H728 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner).
167. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(9)(A) (providing that Section 1331(d)(2) “shall
not apply to any class action that solely involves a claim concerning a covered security
as defined under section 16(f)(3) of the Securities Act of 1933 and section
28(f)(5)(E) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934”) (citation omitted); id. §
1453(d)(1) (providing that Section 1453 “shall not apply to any class action that
solely involves a claim concerning a covered security as defined under section
16(f)(3) of the Securities Act of 1933 and section 28(f)(5)(E) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934”); see also S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 29 (2005), as reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 28 (noting that the legislation “excludes from its federal jurisdiction
grant . . . any securities class actions covered by [SLUSA]”).
168. See 151 CONG. REC. H727 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Rep. Conyers)
(arguing that “[i]f we have learned anything from the Enron, Tyco, Firestone, and
other legal debacles, it is that our citizens need more protection against wrongdoers
in our society, not less”); 151 CONG. REC. H742 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement
of Rep. Meehan) (arguing against CAFA by reference to “corporate crooks at Enron,
WorldCom, and other companies” and “unscrupulous mutual fund managers”); id.
(statement of Rep. Stark) (warning that “the accountability of companies like Eron
[sic] would be held less accountable”); id. at H748 (statement of Rep. Pelosi)
(cautioning that CAFA “would help shield large corporations from any accountability
for Enron-style shareholder fraud”).
169. See 149 CONG. REC. H5282 (daily ed. June 12, 2003) (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner) (noting that draft legislation “specifically excludes a number of
Federal securities and State-based corporate fraud lawsuits”); 148 CONG. REC. H840
(daily ed. Mar. 13, 2002) (statement of Rep. Pryce) (stating that “[t]his has nothing
to do with Enron. . . . [S]ecurities litigation is carved out entirely by this legislation.
It would not cover Enron”).
170. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 106-320, at 3 (1999) (providing that the Interstate
Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999 “shall not apply to any claim concerning a
covered security as that term is defined in [the 1933 Act and 1934 Act]”).
171. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 50 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 46-47; see
also 151 CONG. REC. H729 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner) (noting that “[t]he purpose of this provision is to avoid disturbing
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preserve this “framework” was reiterated throughout the class action
172
bill’s history up through its enactment in the form of CAFA in 2005.
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE AMENDED
NON-REMOVAL PROVISION
In this set of legislation over the past decade, Congress has reset
the balance between federal and state jurisdiction to address
“windfall settlements for trial attorneys, forum shopping, and the
need for more of these large interstate class actions cases to be in
173
Federal court.”
In the securities context, Congress made express
amendments to removal jurisdiction in SLUSA in order to create
174
national standards for securities class actions, and expressly opted
not to disrupt its “carefully crafted” framework when drafting
175
CAFA.
Although Congress appears certain of the fruits of its
efforts, its amendment to the non-removal provision in SLUSA has in
fact wreaked havoc on this “framework.”
Federal courts have been sharply divided in interpreting just how
SLUSA amended the non-removal provision of the 1933 Act. By its
plain language, SLUSA did not completely close the loophole
originally opened by the PSLRA with respect to either class or
individual actions. In terms of class actions, some courts have
remanded 1933 Act claims to state court based on their reading of
SLUSA as amending the express prohibition on removal only as to
class actions “based upon the statutory or common law of any
176
State . . . .” Other courts have denied motions to remand 1933 Act
class actions to state court “[b]ased on the language of the statute
177
and the congressional findings in SLUSA.”
in any way the Federal vs. State court jurisdictional lines already drawn in the
securities litigation class action context by the enactment of [SLUSA]”).
172. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 50, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 46-47; S. REP.
NO. 108-123, at 22 (2003) (noting that CAFA will not affect the jurisdictional lines
already established for securities class actions by SLUSA); S. REP. NO. 106-420, at 34
(2000) (same); H.R. REP. NO. 106-320, at 22 (1999) (noting that “[t]he Committee
recognizes that Congress has previously enacted legislation governing the
adjudication of these claims [the PSLRA and SLUSA] . . . . So as not to disturb the
carefully crafted framework for litigating in this context, claims involving covered
securities are not included in the new section 1332(b) jurisdiction”) (citations
omitted).
173. 151 CONG. REC. H746 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner); see also H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 13 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (noting
that SLUSA is intended “to prevent plaintiffs from seeking to evade the protections
that Federal law provides against abusive litigation by filing suit in State, rather than
in Federal, court”).
174. H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 2.
175. See supra notes 171-172.
176. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b) (2000). See infra notes 185-91 and accompanying text.
177. Alkow v. TXU Corp., Nos. 3:02-CV-2738-K, 3:02-CV-2739-K, 2003 WL
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In terms of individual actions, SLUSA was intended not to change
178
their treatment for purposes of jurisdiction —and accordingly more
conspicuously left open the possibility that they could still be filed in
state court. Taking this safer route, or perhaps as a result of their
own misreading of the convoluted statutory language, some plaintiffs’
lawyers have filed individual 1933 Act claims in state court against the
same defendants on the same essential allegations of fraud as many
179
actions filed and consolidated in federal court.
This well-orchestrated strategy has been brought into the spotlight
by the filing of a large number of individual claims in state courts
across the country in connection with the largest corporate frauds in
history, with real consequences on the administration of parallel
federal litigation. In response, the federal courts handling the
consolidated actions have invoked various sources of judicial
authority to try to effectuate Congress’s stated—yet otherwise
180
unrealized—goals to combat forum shopping.
These efforts have
had mixed success, either ending in reversal or resting on shaky legal
grounds in defiance of fundamental principles regarding the
181
interpretation of federal removal statutes.
Courts have had to grapple not only with the plain meaning of
SLUSA’s amendment to the non-removal provision of the 1933 Act
with respect to class actions, but also the practical effects of its
loopholes with respect to individual actions as exacerbated in
litigation stemming from large-scale corporate frauds. With judicial
discord on both fronts, this “carefully crafted framework” in fact
appears to be in need of further crafting to close the remaining
loopholes existing both in theory and practice.
A. Class Actions
As discussed earlier, SLUSA amended the non-removal provision of
the 1933 Act to read as follows: “Except as provided in section 77p(c) of
this title, no case arising under this subchapter and brought in any
State court of competent jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of
182
the United States.”
Section 77p(c) permits the removal of “[a]ny
covered class action brought in any State court involving a covered
security, as set forth in subsection (b) of this section,” which in turn
21056750, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 8, 2003). See infra notes 192-200 and accompanying
text.
178. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
179. See infra notes 220-222 and accompanying text.
180. See infra Part II.B.
181. See infra Part II.B.
182. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (2000) (emphasis added to reflect amendment).
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implicates only class actions “based upon the statutory or common
183
Accordingly, the plain
law of any State or subdivision thereof.”
language of the non-removal provision, as amended, indicates that
class actions based on federal law fall outside the purview of Section
184
77p(c).
Only a handful of courts have directly interpreted SLUSA’s effect
on the removability of class actions under the 1933 Act. The majority
of those courts have adopted this plain reading of the statute in
185
remanding 1933 Act class actions to state court.
Despite
186
recognizing contrary signals in the legislative history, courts have
not seen fit to modify the statute to coincide with Congress’s intent
where the language is clear, and where removal statutes require strict
187
construction.
These courts even find some support for this strict
183. Id. §§ 77p(b), (c).
184. Numerous courts have implicitly recognized this plain language reading in
dicta. See, e.g., Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 398 F.3d 294, 298 (3d Cir.
2005) (noting that SLUSA “creates an express exception to the well-pleaded
complaint rule, conferring federal removal jurisdiction over a unique class of state
law claims”); Dabit v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 395 F.3d 25, 33
(2d Cir. 2005) (directing that “the action must be based on state or local law” to be
removable under SLUSA), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 34 (2005); Popp Telecom, Inc. v.
Am. Sharecom, Inc., 361 F.3d 482, 488 (8th Cir. 2004) (explaining that SLUSA
“provides for removal to federal court and dismissal of certain class actions brought
under state law”); Riley v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 292 F.3d 1334,
1342 (11th Cir. 2002) (stating that “in order to remove an action to federal court
under SLUSA, the removing party must show [inter alia] that . . . the plaintiffs’
claims are based on state law”).
185. See, e.g., Higginbotham v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., No. 04 C 4909, 04 C 7096, 2005
WL 1272271, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 25, 2005) (remanding a case containing only
Section 11 claim because statutory language unambiguously limits removal to
“certain class actions containing state law claims”); Zia v. Medical Staffing Network,
Inc., 336 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1310 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (remanding a case comprising only
1933 Act claims because removal requires plaintiff’s claims to be based in state law);
In re Tyco Int’l, Ltd., 322 F. Supp. 2d 116, 121 (D.N.H. 2004) (finding that SLUSA’s
text and legislative history do not support removal of 1933 Act claims under Section
77p(c)); Haw. Structural Ironworkers Pension Trust Fund v. Calpine Corp., No.
03CV0714BTM, 2003 WL 23509312, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2003) (holding that
“the plain language of section 77p(c) limits removal to class actions that are based
upon state claims.”); Nauheim v. Interpublic Group of Cos., No. 02-C-9211, 2003 WL
1888843, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2003) (deciding that the 1933 Act clearly permits
the removal of only class actions based on state law); Martin v. Bellsouth Corp., No.
03-CV-728-WBH, slip op. at 5 (N.D. Ga. July 7, 2003) (remanding 1933 Act claim
based on SLUSA’s plain language despite express legislative intent to prevent
plaintiffs from abusively litigating by filing in state court); In re Waste Mgmt. Inc. Sec.
Litig., 194 F. Supp. 2d 590, 593 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (concluding that SLUSA’s
amendment to the non-removal provision only applies to class actions asserting state
statutory or common law claims and not to those based solely on federal law like the
1933 Act).
186. See Haw. Structural Ironworkers, 2003 WL 23509312, at *2; In re Tyco Int’l,
Ltd., 322 F. Supp. 2d at 121 n.9.
187. Haw. Structural Ironworkers, 2003 WL 23509312, at *2; Martin, slip op. at 5; In
re Waste Mgmt., Inc. Sec. Litig., 194 F. Supp. 2d at 592 (stating that removal statutes
should be strictly construed to preclude removal to federal court).
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construction in the legislative history, as the stated purpose of SLUSA
ended up being “to limit the conduct of securities class actions under
188
Moreover, the removal provisions in SLUSA were
State law.”
precisely drawn, and no express statement was made by Congress
modifying the traditional rule prohibiting the removal of cases
189
brought under the 1933 Act.
“Congress could have easily made a
statement in SLUSA expressly modifying this provision had it so
190
intended.” Rather, the plain language of the statute closes only the
loophole created by state law claims, not all claims filed in state
191
court.
Other courts have reached the opposite conclusion by effectively
rewriting the SLUSA amendment in light of the broader intent
192
expressed throughout its legislative history. While legislative history
193
is typically ignored where the relevant statute is unambiguous, it
may be considered where there is a clearly expressed contrary
legislative intent that would warrant a different construction of the
194
statute.
It is on this basis that, despite the plain meaning of the
statute, these courts have sought to correct the “inartfully (or even
inaccurately) worded” provision of SLUSA in light of various
195
conflicting passages in its legislative history.
One such passage is
188. Nauheim, 2003 WL 1888843, at *5 (quoting Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998 § 2).
189. See In re Waste Mgmt. Sec. Litig., 194 F. Supp. 2d at 596.
190. Id.
191. See In re Tyco Int’l, Ltd., 322 F. Supp. 2d at 120 (noting SLUSA was designed
to address state law claims rather than claims under the 1933 Act).
192. See Lowinger v. Johnston, No. 3:05CV316-H, 2005 WL 2592229, at *4
(W.D.N.C. Oct. 13, 2005) (holding that the removal of 1933 Act claims from state
court was consistent with Congress’s intent); In re King Pharms., Inc., No. 2:03-CV-77,
slip op. at 4 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 6, 2004) (determining that legislative history supports
the removal of state class actions asserting claims exclusively under the 1933 Act to
federal court); Kulinski v. Am. Elec. Power Co., No. Civ.A.C-2-03-412, 2003 WL
24032299, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 19, 2003) (noting that “covered class actions” are
“clearly” removable to federal court); Alkow v. TXU Corp., Nos. 3:02-CV-2738-K,
3:02-CV-2739-K, 2003 WL 21056750, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 8, 2003) (stating that
Congress intended SLUSA to prevent tactics employed by plaintiffs to avoid federal
court); Brody v. Homestore, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 2003)
(concluding that class actions brought under the 1933 Act are removable).
193. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S.
687, 730 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that legislative history can be used
only to clarify, not contradict, an unambiguous statutory text).
194. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177 (1993); see Griffin v. Oceanic
Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982) (stating that statutory interpretations
leading to absurd results should be avoided if an alternative interpretation is
consistent with the stated legislative purpose).
195. Brody, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 1123. Numerous courts and commentators have
simply assumed that SLUSA renders all 1933 Act claims removable without analysis.
See, e.g., Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. WorldCom, Inc., 368 F.3d 86, 98-101 (2d
Cir. 2004) (noting that in addition to state law claims, 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c) removes
class actions filed in state court from the purview of the non-removal provision), cert.
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the expressed intent to end the shift to state courts by “enact[ing]
national standards for securities class action lawsuits involving
196
nationally traded securities.” If lawsuits involving nationally traded
securities belong in federal court, and if state law claims are
removable to federal court under SLUSA, then federal law claims
197
under the 1933 Act logically must belong in federal court as well.
“[T]hat SLUSA meant to authorize removal of only securities
litigation brought pursuant to state law is simply irreconcilable with
198
these findings.” Otherwise, “SLUSA did not counteract the shift in
cases to state courts that Congress determined had frustrated the
199
intent of PSLRA.”
Some courts and commentators argue one step further that, “[i]f
§ 77p(c) applies only to state law claims,” SLUSA’s amendment to the
non-removal provision would be meaningless because no claim under
200
the 1933 Act would be removable.
However, these commentaries
overlook the fact that the non-removal provision prevents removal of

denied, 543 U.S. 1080 (2005); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 293 B.R. 308, 327
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding that Sections 16 and 22 of the 1933 Act make federal court
the forum for class actions involving covered securities with few limited exceptions);
David M. Brodsky, Private Actions and Private Rights: Current Hot Trends in Securities
Litigation, in 1151 CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE HANDBOOK SERIES: 31ST ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 773, 806 (Practicing Law Institute 1999)
(commenting that SLUSA prevents 1933 Act actions from being heard in state
court); Painter, supra note 115, at 2-3 (noting that SLUSA prevents “class actions in
state court or under state law”) (emphasis added).
196. Kulinski, 2003 WL 24032299, at *4 (quoting Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)).
197. See id. (quoting 144 CONG. REC. H11020 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1998) (statement
of Rep. Bliley)); see also Lowinger, 2005 WL 2592229, at *4 (finding that “removal of
class actions consisting of 1933 Act claims is consistent with Congress’ express
intention ‘to make Federal court the exclusive venue for securities fraud class action
litigation’”) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 105-640, at 10 (1998))); Brody, 240 F. Supp. 2d at
1124 (emphasizing that “[t]he purpose of this title is to prevent plaintiffs from
seeking to evade the protections the Federal law provides against abusive litigation by
filing suit in State, rather than in Federal, court” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at
13 (1998) (Conf. Rep.))); H.R. REP. NO. 105-640, at 8-9 (1998) (determining that
class actions relating to a “covered security” alleging fraud must be maintained in
federal court pursuant to federal securities law).
198. Brody, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 1124; see also In re King Pharms., Inc., No. 2:03-CV77, slip op. at 4 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 6, 2004) (holding that the legislative history and
common sense allow the removal of 1933 Act class actions filed in state court).
199. Alkow v. TXU Corp., Nos. 3:02-CV-2738-K, 3:02-CV-2739-K, 2003 WL
21056750, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 8, 2003).
200. Id. at *1; see also Brody, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 1124 (agreeing that plaintiff’s
interpretation of Section 77p(b)-(c) would defeat the purpose of the amendment to
Section 77v(a)); Andrew J. Morris & Fatima A. Goss, Why Claims Under the Securities Act
of 1933 Are Removable to Federal Court, 36 Sec. Reg. & Law Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 626
(Apr. 5, 2004) (claiming that the exception must extend beyond state-law claims,
otherwise SLUSA’s amendment to the non-removal provision would be
meaningless).
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201

both claims and cases arising under the 1933 Act. For example, a
state law claim filed conjunctively with 1933 Act claims may fall within
202
such a case. Even state law claims alone may “arise under” federal
law for purposes of removal if the complaint establishes a right to
203
relief under state law which has a question of federal law in dispute.
As a result, the plain language of the amendment to the non-removal
provision does have meaning because a case may “arise under” the
1933 Act but still be based on state law. However, SLUSA’s
amendment to the non-removal provision would then have the
limited—and convoluted—purpose of allowing removal of only state
204
law claims that turn on the 1933 Act.
It is doubtful that Congress
intended this anomalous result without any mention of its distinct
and narrow contours anywhere in the legislative history.
Some commentators also offer an alternative reading of the plain
language of SLUSA to subject 1933 Act claims to removal without
205
resorting to legislative history.
Their analysis is based on the
placement of the phrase “as set forth in subsection (b)” in Section
77p(c)—saying that it modifies the immediately preceding term
206
“covered security” as opposed to “covered class action.” Under that
reading of the statute, whereas the term “covered class action” is
modified by the phrase “based upon the statutory or common law of
any State” in Section 77p(b), the term “covered security” is not. If
the phrase “as set forth in subsection (b)” in Section 77p(c) modifies
only the term “covered security,” “covered class actions” would be
removable to federal court whether based on state or federal law.
However, this reading of the statute is invalidated by the operation
of other provisions of SLUSA. If class actions under federal law were
removable under Section 77p(c), they must also “be subject to
207
subsection (b),”
by which they could not subsequently “be
201. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (2000).
202. See In re Tyco Int’l, Ltd., 322 F. Supp. 2d 116, 120 (D.N.H. 2004)
(determining that any case which contains a 1933 Act claim arises under the 1933
Act even in the presence of state law claims that might be a basis for removal).
203. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 13 (1983).
204. Id. at 9.
205. See Jordan A. Costa, Removal of Securities Act of 1933 Claims After SLUSA: What
Congress Changed, and What It Left Alone, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1193, 1217 (2005)
(arguing that 1933 Act claims filed in conjunction with state law claims in a state
court are removable under SLUSA); Morris & Goss, supra note 200, at 626 (noting
that all 1933 Act claims are removable based on plain language of SLUSA’s
amendment).
206. Morris & Goss, supra note 200, at 625-26.
207. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c) (2000) (stating that “[a]ny covered class action brought in
any State court involving a covered security, as set forth in subsection (b), shall be
removable to the Federal district court for the district in which the action is pending,
and shall be subject to subsection (b)”) (emphasis added); see Costa, supra note 205, at
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maintained in any State or Federal court by any private party.” In
other words, class actions removable under SLUSA are preempted by
209
federal law. Yet it is nonsensical for federal claims to be preempted
210
by federal law. Nor is there any hint that Congress intended to alter
the scope of available 1933 Act claims. Perhaps in focusing on
preemption (limited to state law claims), Congress overlooked the
nuance that SLUSA would thus not provide for the removal of
otherwise non-removable federal law claims under the 1933 Act.
This wide disparity in judicial and academic interpretation mirrors
the fissure between the statutory language and legislative history as to
how SLUSA applies to 1933 Act claims. SLUSA itself contains the
ambiguously expressed intent “to prevent certain State private
securities class action lawsuits alleging fraud from being used to
211
frustrate the objectives of the [PSLRA].”
But are the referenced
“State” suits those filed in state court, or just those based on state law?
The legislative history strongly suggests the former, as members of
Congress repeated time and again their intent to stop the shift from
federal court to state court and to create national standards for cases
212
of national interest.
However, the plain language of SLUSA’s
amendment to the non-removal provision provides only for the
latter—that is, removing class actions based on state law to federal
court while illogically allowing class actions based on federal law (i.e.,
the 1933 Act) to remain in state court. Naturally, while some courts
faithfully adopt the plain language of the statute, others have seen fit
to “correct” it to effectuate what Congress had repeatedly expressed
as its overriding goals.
B. Individual Actions
SLUSA focused on the shift of class action suits from federal to
state court in the wake of the PSLRA. As the discussion above makes
clear, a non-obvious loophole remains for class actions under the
1217 (proposing removal of 1933 Act claims despite acknowledging that a case, to be
removable, must be a covered class action, involve a covered security and be subject
to Section 77p(b)).
208. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b).
209. See United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 96263 (9th Cir. 2004) (characterizing SLUSA as a “federal statute that preempts state-law
securities actions”).
210. See Morris & Goss, supra note 200, at 626 (acknowledging that Section 77p(b)
should be limited to state law claims, because only they can be preempted, but
ignoring that all removable actions under Section 77p(c) must also be subject to
Section 77p(b)).
211. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 § 2, Pub. L. No. 105-353,
112 Stat. 3227 (codified at scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
212. See supra notes 116-117, 124-125 and accompanying text.
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1933 Act. What is more obvious is that, in applying only to class
actions, SLUSA expressly did not alter the treatment of individual
213
Just as the PSLRA ignited a flight to state court for class
suits.
actions, SLUSA has done the same for individual actions under both
state law and the 1933 Act.
214
Although data on state court filings are not readily available,
plaintiffs’ lawyers have brought practical meaning to this loophole by
orchestrating a series of individual 1933 Act claims in state court in a
very high-profile setting—the massive corporate frauds of the likes of
Enron and WorldCom. Congress has not further amended the non215
removal provision of the 1933 Act in reaction to this development.
Citing the rubric that “under the securities laws, federal jurisdiction is
216
increasingly favored,” courts have sought to close the more obvious
loophole for individual 1933 Act claims despite the fact that the nonremoval provision remains absolute with respect to such claims. The
means utilized to achieve that end, however, have been questionable
at best. Not surprisingly, this judicial effort has unfolded primarily in
the wake of one of the largest corporate frauds and bankruptcies in
United States history: the collapse of WorldCom.
In June 2002, WorldCom announced that it had improperly
accounted for almost $4 billion in costs, and soon thereafter filed for
217
Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Numerous securities fraud class actions—
including at least twenty in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York alone—were filed in federal court
across the country against WorldCom and its officers, directors,
218
underwriters, accountants, and research analysts. In October 2002,
the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated thirty-nine
nationwide class actions, along with those individual actions filed in
or removed to federal court, before Judge Denise Cote in the
219
Southern District of New York.
213. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 § 2.
214. See, e.g., Perino, supra note 115, at 302 (noting the lack of data on state class
actions).
215. To the contrary, Congress expressly exempted the federal securities laws
from CAFA to preserve the jurisdictional standards established in SLUSA. See supra
notes 167-172 and accompanying text.
216. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 293 B.R. 308, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
217. Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. WorldCom, Inc., 368 F.3d 86, 91 (2d Cir.
2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1080 (2005). WorldCom later restated its earnings for
2000 and 2001 by approximately $76 billion. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 352 F.
Supp. 2d 472, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
218. See Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 368 F.3d at 91.
219. In re WorldCom, Inc., Sec. & “ERISA” Litig., 226 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (J.P.M.L.
2002). The consolidated class actions had been filed in the Southern District of New
York, the Southern District of Mississippi, the Southern District of Florida, the
Northern District of California, and the District of the District of Columbia. Id. at
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While many class actions were predictably filed in federal court
under the mandates of the PSLRA and SLUSA, some plaintiffs’
lawyers exploited the jurisdictional uncertainties stemming from that
legislation by filing individual actions asserting only 1933 Act claims
in state court. These parallel state actions arose from the underlying
220
These
financial frauds that were the basis of the federal actions.
individual actions were not filed in individual fashion. One law firm,
Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, filed at least forty-seven
individual actions on behalf of over 120 plaintiffs in at least eight
221
states asserting claims exclusively under the 1933 Act.
Milberg
Weiss even carefully selected its individual plaintiffs—“a coalition of
public and private pension funds with $2 to $3 billion in losses” in
222
WorldCom securities.
The non-removal provision of the 1933 Act was the undisputed
223
catalyst for this litigation strategy. Milberg Weiss encouraged large
institutional investors to file individual actions instead of
224
participating in class actions, and to coordinate litigation in state
courts across the country apart from any class action suits in federal
225
court.
226
Judge Cote did not take kindly to this “de facto class action”
being waged in state courts, and invoked a new judicial tool for each
type of threat to the consolidated federal actions. First, Judge Cote
granted relief to the lead plaintiff in the MDL litigation in
connection with Milberg Weiss’s letter campaign to prospective
227
plaintiffs for individual state court actions.
Judge Cote found that
these letters did not present “a forthright description of the
advantages and disadvantages of both the individual action and class

1352.
220. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 315 F. Supp. 2d 527, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
221. Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 368 F.3d at 91.
222. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ.3288, 2003 WL 22701241, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2003).
223. See id. at *5 n.1 (noting Milberg Weiss’s strategy to file numerous claims in
different states and to resist removal of any cases to federal court by “eschew[ing] the
filing of [1934] Act claims even if such claims would increase a plaintiff’s leverage,
since the presence of [1934] Act claims would provide an independent basis for
removal of the cases to federal court”); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 293 B.R. 308,
315 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (describing litigation strategy of Milberg Weiss).
224. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2003 WL 22701241, at *6.
225. Id. at *4. Milberg Weiss itself attested that it would conduct the individual
actions in a “coordinated cooperative manner so as to share the benefits of our
investigatory efforts, discovery and other information, as well as experts, thus
achieving economies of scale.” Id. (quoting letter from Milberg Weiss to Asbestos
Workers Local 12 Annuity Fund (May 23, 2003)).
226. Id. at *6.
227. Id. at *7.
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228

action options.”
For example, the letters did not inform investors
of the more restrictive statute of limitations applicable to 1933 Act
claims, nor certain protections afforded class members in federal
court in terms of adequacy of representation, distribution of awards,
229
and curbs on attorney’s fees.
As a result, Judge Cote ordered not
only curative notices to members of the certified class before her, but
separate notices to investors who had filed or could file individual
230
actions in other courts.
Second, Judge Cote sought to neutralize the potentially disruptive
effect of the pending individual actions in state courts on her
231
management of the consolidated federal actions.
To that end,
Judge Cote sent a proposed coordination order to state court judges
232
presiding over individual actions to prevent delay of or interference
with the discovery and trial schedule for the consolidated actions in
233
federal court. Specifically, her proposed order called for discovery
in the federal and state actions to be coordinated, the PSLRAmandated stay of discovery in the federal actions to apply to the state
actions, and no trial in the state actions to be set before the
234
scheduled trial date of the federal actions in January 2005.
In defiance of this proposal, an Alabama state court judge set an
235
Judge Cote
individual case for trial beginning in October 2004.
reasoned that this earlier trial in state court would delay the class
action trial given the need for extensive motions practice to
determine its collateral estoppel effect on the federal actions and the
236
diversion of the time and energy of the defendants.
Judge Cote
237
resorted to invoking the All Writs Act to enjoin the state court trial

228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at *8.
231. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 315 F. Supp. 2d 527, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
232. See id. at 531 n.3, 536 (noting pendency of Retirement Sys. of Ala. v. J.P. Morgan
Chase & Co., No. CV 2002-1947(a)-PR (Ala. Cir. Ct. filed July 15, 2002)); City of
Birmingham Ret. & Relief Fund v. Citigroup Inc., No. 03-2373(HLB) (Ala. Cir. Ct. Apr.
15, 2003); Standard Life Inv., Ltd. v. Ebbers, No. 04-1938 (D.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 12,
2004); Illinois Mun. Ret. Fund v. Citigroup Inc., No. 03 L 772 (Ill. Cir. Ct. filed June 18,
2003); and Steelworkers Pension Trust v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 030303441 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl.
filed Mar. 21, 2003)).
233. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ.3288, 2004 WL 817355 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 30, 2004).
234. Id. at *2.
235. See In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 315 F. Supp. 2d at 538 (reviewing the
scheduling actions of Judge Price in Retirement Systems of Alabama).
236. Id. at 545.
237. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000) (permitting federal courts to issue writs if
necessary to aid their jurisdictions).
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until the conclusion of the federal class action trial. However, the
239
Second Circuit quickly and soundly reversed that decision.
Third, Judge Cote denied motions to remand individual 1933 Act
240
actions removed to her from New York state court.
Whereas
plaintiffs’ lawyers had artfully pleaded individual actions under the
241
1933 Act to remain in state court, the WorldCom Defendants were
equally clever in removing these individual actions to federal court.
As discussed above, SLUSA amended the non-removal provision of
the 1933 Act only in terms of class action suits—the non-removal
provision was still absolute with respect to individual actions.
Nonetheless, the WorldCom Defendants removed the individual
actions to federal court as actions “related to” the WorldCom
242
bankruptcy pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a). The alleged “relation”
of these individual actions to the WorldCom bankruptcy was the
potential for contribution, indemnification, and contractual
reimbursement claims by the WorldCom Defendants against
WorldCom in a subsequent, separate lawsuit if the WorldCom
243
Defendants were in fact found liable in these individual actions.
The plaintiffs filed motions for remand to state court on two
grounds. First, they argued that the non-removal provision of the
1933 Act was absolute with no exception made for claims “related to”
244
a bankruptcy. Second, they argued that, even if claims “related to”
a bankruptcy could be removed in spite of the non-removal provision
of the 1933 Act, their individual actions were not “related to” the
WorldCom bankruptcy given the fact that WorldCom was not a
defendant, and could be deemed effectively liable only in a separate
subsequent action to be filed by the WorldCom Defendants against
245
WorldCom.
Judge Cote rejected both of these arguments, found
246
247
or equitable remand
under the
no basis for abstention
238. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 315 F. Supp. 2d at 551.
239. See Ret. Sys. of Ala. v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 386 F.3d 419, 421 (2d Cir.
2004) (holding that the “necessary in aid of its jurisdiction” exception to the
Anti-Injunction Act does not allow a district court to preserve its trial date by
enjoining state court proceedings).
240. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 293 B.R. 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
241. WorldCom filed for bankruptcy in July 2002. At that moment, the automatic
stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code halted litigation against WorldCom. 11 U.S.C.
§ 362 (2000). However, plaintiffs proceeded with claims against WorldCom officers,
directors, auditors, underwriters, and research analysts (hereinafter “WorldCom
Defendants”).
242. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 293 B.R. at 310-12.
243. Id. at 316.
244. Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. WorldCom, Inc., 368 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir.
2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1080 (2005).
245. Id.
246. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) (2000) (providing that a district court may, “in the
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bankruptcy jurisdiction and removal statutes, and denied the motions
248
for remand.
The Second Circuit accepted an interlocutory appeal of the denial
of the motions for remand solely on the first argument raised by the
249
plaintiffs before Judge Cote.
As a “case of first impression in the
courts of appeals,” the Second Circuit addressed “whether a federal
district court may exercise bankruptcy jurisdiction over generally
250
nonremovable claims brought under the Securities Act of 1933.”
This issue pitted two expressly conflicting provisions against each
other: the non-removal provision (Section 22(a)) of the 1933 Act,
and Section 1452 of the federal removal statutes, which permits
251
removal of claims that are “related to” a federal bankruptcy case.
The Second Circuit began its analysis with a comparative overview
of the two removal provisions. The bankruptcy removal provision was
enacted in 1978 to “enable the bankruptcy courts . . . to dispose of
controversies that arise in bankruptcy cases or under the bankruptcy
code,” and to save the estate “great cost and delay” by trying such
actions in the bankruptcy, as opposed to state or federal district
252
court.
Interestingly, the Second Circuit did not assess how the
individual actions at issue would advance these forms of legislative
253
Indeed, the individual actions were before the district
intent.
court—not the bankruptcy court administering the WorldCom
estate—and resulted in no direct cost to WorldCom, which was not a
254
named defendant.
interest of justice,” abstain from hearing cases either relating to or arising out of Title
11); id. § 1334(c)(2) (providing that a district court shall abstain from hearing state
cases "related to a case under title 11 but not arising under title 11 or arising in a
case under title 11”).
247. See id. § 1452(b) (providing that if the bankruptcy claim is removed to district
court, such district court may remand such a claim on “any equitable ground”).
248. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 293 B.R. at 334.
249. Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 368 F.3d at 95. The Second Circuit declined to
review Judge Cote’s decision that the plaintiffs’ claims were “related to” the
WorldCom bankruptcy “notwithstanding the tenuous connection between those
claims and WorldCom’s reorganization process.” Id. at 96. In declining review, the
Second Circuit stated that it was “not convinced [the Plaintiffs] raised a ‘question of
law’” thus failing to meet the standard for interlocutory review under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b). Id. Nor did the Second Circuit review Judge Cote’s decision that
abstention and equitable remand were inappropriate pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1334(c), 1452(b), respectively. Id.
250. Id. at 90.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 96-97 (citing S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 153 (1977), as reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5939).
253. See id. at 97 (stating only generally that Sections 1452(a) and 1334(b) were
intended to centralize bankruptcy-related litigation in bankruptcy courts and
decrease litigation costs to the estate).
254. See In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ.3288, 2003 WL 22953644, at
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The Second Circuit then reviewed the history of the non-removal
provision of the 1933 Act, specifically its having been amended for
255
the first time by SLUSA and only with respect to class actions. The
direct conflict thus arose: “While the bankruptcy removal statute
unambiguously states that any civil action brought by a private party
in state court . . . may be removed to federal court if the action is
related to a bankruptcy case, Section 22(a) of the [1933] Act states, in
equally unambiguous terms, that individual actions under the [1933]
256
Act may not be removed to state court.”
The Second Circuit employed a number of tools of statutory
interpretation to address this conflict. Its first tool—the maxim
257
expressio unius est exclusio alterius —was inconclusive, as both statutes
258
contained express exceptions exclusive of the other.
The court
placed greater attention on its second tool, specificity, stating that
“[w]here there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will
not be controlled or nullified by a general one, regardless of the
259
priority of enactment.”
The court first noted that neither statute was more specific directly
in terms of the other: “just as Section 1452(a) applies to many claims
that are not brought under the 1933 Act, Section 22(a) applies to
260
many claims that are not ‘related to’ a bankruptcy.” The court also
found that Section 22(a) and Section 1452(a) were of similar scope
in applying to a defined class of claims—as opposed to one applying
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2003) (noting retention of individual actions against the
WorldCom Defendants—not WorldCom—in federal district court).
255. Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 368 F.3d at 98.
256. Id.
257. See, e.g., United Dominion Indus., Inc. v. United States, 532 U.S. 822, 836
(2001) (stating that, under this maxim, “[t]he logic that invests the omission with
significance is familiar: the mention of some implies the exclusion of others not
mentioned.”).
258. Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 368 F.3d at 101. The bankruptcy removal statute
contains exceptions for “a proceeding before the United States Tax Court [and] a
civil action by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit’s police or
regulatory power . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a) (2000). The non-removal provision of
the 1933 Act contains an exception “as provided in section 77p(c) of this title . . . .”
15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (2000). In any event, this statutory maxim has been criticized as
“a questionable one in light of the dubious reliability of inferring specific intent from
silence.” Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
2071, 2109 n.182 (1990). Indeed, courts ignore the maxim when its application
would lead to results producing an opposite effect from that intended by the
legislation. See, e.g., Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 136 (1991); EEOC v.
Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 120 (1988)(clarifying that where
Congress is silent on a certain statutory application, no inference drawn from such
silence may be “credited when it is contrary to all other textual and contextual
evidence of congressional intent”).
259. Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 368 F.3d at 101 (quoting Radzanower v. Touche
Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976)).
260. Id. at 102.
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to a “broad universe of potential defendants” and the other to a
261
However, the court did not consider just
“particularized” group.
how expansive those classes of claims were, or how the particular
claims before it fell specifically within those classes. For example,
whereas Section 22(a) applies to just a few narrow substantive claims
addressing specific subjects, Section 1452(a) applies to claims of all
subjects—depending only on whether they relate or do not relate to a
bankruptcy. Moreover, the claims at hand were specifically brought
under the 1933 Act, and had at best a “tenuous connection” to the
262
WorldCom bankruptcy.
The court also determined that even if Section 22(a) were more
“specific,” its application would “unduly interfere” with the workings
263
of Section 1452(a).
That interference was seen as undue
particularly in Chapter 11 cases involving “repetitive and time264
consuming discovery proceedings in multiple state courts.”
However, the court spoke of the bankruptcy-“related” nature of the
1933 Act claims only in hypothetical terms—the potential for
contribution and indemnification sought by defendants in separate
actions against WorldCom which “can, in some circumstances, affect
265
the administration of a bankrupt estate.” In other words, there was
no mention as to how these actions would actually interfere with the
administration of WorldCom, which was not even a named defendant
in the removed actions. Moreover, the court did not address how the
WorldCom estate would be affected any more or less if 1933 Act
claims were remanded to and tried in state court versus remaining in
federal district court. Indeed, regardless of where these predicate
actions were tried, the WorldCom Defendants—if in fact found liable
in those actions—would have to file separate subsequent actions for
contribution or indemnification.
Ultimately, the Second Circuit found the “specificity” inquiry to be
266
inconclusive.
With no solution yielded from its first two analyses,
the court turned to the “rule of recency,” namely that “when two
statutes are in irreconcilable conflict, we must give effect to the most

261. Id. (quoting Radzanower, 426 U.S. at 148, 153-54).
262. Id. at 96.
263. Id. at 103 (citing Radzanower, 426 U.S. at 148, 156).
264. Id. at 104.
265. Id. The Second Circuit supported its decision on these observations despite
elsewhere finding a “tenuous connection between those claims and WorldCom’s
reorganization process,” id. at 96, and declining to address whether the claims in the
case fell within the purview of 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a). Id. at 108.
266. See id. at 104 (abandoning the specificity analysis based on the conclusion
that Section 22(a) is not more narrow in class coverage than Section 1452(a)).
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267

recently enacted statute . . . .”
Whereas the bankruptcy removal
268
provision was enacted in 1978, Section 22(a) was enacted earlier in
269
1933 but amended later in 1998. The Court did not find the more
recent amendment of Section 22(a) “particularly probative,” because
Congress expressed an intent not to “alter the jurisdictional scheme
270
applicable to individual actions under the 1933 Act.”
At the same
time, it can be said that in 1998 Congress simply reaffirmed the nonremoval of all 1933 Act individual claims—even those “related to” a
271
bankruptcy—as part of its complex amendment to Section 22(a).
Moreover, while the court acknowledged that repeals by implication
are disfavored, its ultimate decision was in fact a repeal by implication
272
of Section 22(a).
Indeed, the Second Circuit found no basis for resolving the conflict
in any of these maxims of statutory construction. Rather, the court
resorted to a contextual analysis of Section 1452(a) as a component
273
of the general removal jurisdiction scheme of Title 28.
Section
1441(a) is the general removal statute, and allows for removal of cases
over which the federal courts have original jurisdiction “[e]xcept as
otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress”—for example,
274
Section 22(a) of the 1933 Act.
Because Section 1452(a) contains
no such exception, the court reasoned that “Congress did not intend
for Section 22(a) and its analogues to bar removal of ‘related to’
275
claims.”
In the court’s view, if the removal of a claim subject to a
non-removal provision is by means of Section 1441(a), removal is not
276
warranted given the exception in that provision.
On the other

267. Id. (quoting In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 922 F.2d 984, 991 (2d Cir. 1990)).
268. The bankruptcy removal provision took its current form (28 U.S.C. § 1452)
in the enactment of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
269. On November 3, 1998, Congress passed the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
270. Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 368 F.3d at 104 (emphasis in original); see also
supra note 119 (emphasizing that SLUSA focuses on class action litigation without
intent to affect state individual lawsuits).
271. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 38182 (1982) (stating that when Congress undergoes a “comprehensive reexamination
and significant amendment” of a statute and leaves certain provisions “intact,” this
serves to indicate that Congress “affirmatively intended” preservation of such
provision).
272. Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 368 F.3d at 104 (quoting Henderson v. INS, 157
F.3d 106, 119 (2d Cir. 1998)); see Posadas v. Nat’l City Bank of N.Y., 296 U.S. 497, 503
(1936) (stating the “cardinal rule” that “repeals by implication are not favored”).
273. Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 368 F.3d at 105.
274. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2000).
275. Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 368 F.3d at 106.
276. Id. at 107.
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hand, “[i]f removal is being effectuated through a provision that
confers additional removal jurisdiction [i.e., Section 1452(a)], and
that provision contains no exception for non-removable federal
277
claims, the provision should be given full effect.”
Otherwise, if
Section 22(a) were to trump Section 1452(a), the exception in
278
Section 1441(a) “would serve no apparent purpose.”
The Second Circuit justified this contextual analysis primarily on its
prior holding that another removal statute without the exception
found in Section 1441(a), Section 1441(c), trumped a federal non279
removal provision. Despite this one similarity of omission, Section
1441(c) and Section 1452(a) have a far more significant substantive
distinction of greater relevance to the issue before the Second
Circuit. Unlike any other removal statute, Section 1441(c) expressly
permits the removal of “otherwise non-removable claims” such as
280
In providing for the removal of
those under the 1933 Act.
otherwise non-removable claims, it is inconceivable that Section
1441(c) would also contain the Section 1441(a) exception.
Therefore, the absence of the Section 1441(a) exception from
Section 1441(c) should be considered inapposite. Moreover, in
Gonsalves v. Amoco Shipping Co., the decision on which it was relying,
the Second Circuit had emphasized that the specific statutory
conditions must be met “before the force of section 1441(c) can
defeat the congressional preference expressed in [the federal non281
removal provision].” Here, conversely, the Second Circuit saw fit to
set aside this “congressional preference” even where the removal
statute was silent as to the removal of otherwise non-removable
282
claims.
This contextual analysis of the general removal statutes was the sole
factor tipping the balance in favor of Section 1452(a). Otherwise,
each of the factors evaluated by the Second Circuit favored Section
22(a) at least as much as Section 1452(a). Just as “Congress did not
manifest an intent to alter preexisting law when it amended the 1933
Act in 1998,” the same could have been said that Congress did not
manifest an intent to alter preexisting law—namely, the non-removal

277. Id.
278. Id. at 106.
279. Id. at 106-07 (citing Gonsalves v. Amoco Shipping Co., 733 F.2d 1020, 1022-23
(2d Cir. 1984)).
280. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (2000).
281. Gonsalves, 733 F.2d at 1026.
282. See Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 368 F.3d at 106-07 (remarking that Section
1441(c) permitted removal of non-removable claims in certain instances (citing
Gonsalves, 733 F.2d at 1022-23)).
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of 1933 Act claims under Section 22(a)—when it enacted Section
283
1452(a) in 1978. Whereas “Section 1452(a) contains no exception
for federal claims that are expressly nonremovable under an Act of
Congress,” Section 22(a)—both before and after 1998—contains no
284
exception for claims “related to” a bankruptcy.
And though the
Court declined to “create a distinction between two classes of ‘related
to’ claims that is wholly absent from the bankruptcy removal statute,”
it saw fit to create such a distinction wholly absent from the 1933 Act
285
between claims “related to” and “unrelated to” a bankruptcy.
Of particular note, the Second Circuit answered this “close
question” without even a mention of the well-established core
principle developed in its own circuit and throughout the federal
courts: that “federal courts construe the removal statute narrowly,
286
resolving any doubts against removability.”
To the contrary, the
Second Circuit considered none of the numerous, expresslyacknowledged uncertainties in its comparative analysis to weigh
against removal, and construed the removal statutes broadly—
particularly those statutes which provide “additional removal
287
jurisdiction.”
In sum, the Second Circuit appears to have been
fixated on reaching a certain end rather than applying certain
fundamental means of statutory interpretation.
The Second Circuit has been the only appellate court to address
288
this statutory conflict.
At the district court level, however, some
courts foreshadowed the Second Circuit’s decision in finding in favor

283. Id. at 105.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 108.
286. Lupo v. Human Affairs Int’l, Inc., 28 F.3d 269, 274 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing
Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108 (1941)); see Romero v. Int’l
Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379 (1959) (noting the “traditional
reluctance” of the Court to give jurisdictional statutes a broad reading); Russell
Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 264 F.3d 1040, 1050 (11th Cir. 2001) (identifying
the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts and noting that where uncertainty exists
concerning removal jurisdiction, the favored resolution is remand); Coyne v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir.1999) (affirming that remand is the proper
course of action where doubt exists concerning the “propriety of removal”).
287. Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 368 F.3d at 107 (emphasis in original).
288. Other circuit courts have received appeals of remand orders on the same
issues, but have denied them based on the limited scope of appellate review of
remand orders. See, e.g., Ill. Mun. Ret. Fund v. Citigroup, Inc., 391 F.3d 844, 850-52
(7th Cir. 2004) (stating that the circuit court may only “review the contested exercise
of authority without considering the reasoning in the district court’s remand order,”
and concluding that “the district court did not exceed its authority in issuing a
remand order”); Ret. Sys. of Ala. v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., No. 02-15385, 2003 WL
23526878, at *1 (11th Cir. June 19, 2003) (finding lack of jurisdiction to consider
whether district court abused its discretion in remanding action to state court based
on constitutionality of statutory provisions barring appellate review).
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of Section 1452 on at least one maxim of statutory interpretation.
However, as is to be expected given the numerous infirmities of the
Second Circuit’s opinion, other district courts have resolved the
statutory conflict in favor of the non-removal provision of the 1933
290
Act on a variety of grounds.
Some courts have disagreed with the
291
Second Circuit’s application of both the rule of recency and
292
specificity.
Still other courts have found no conflict between the
two statutes based on their affirmative answer to the question not
addressed by the Second Circuit: that potential indemnification
claims against the bankruptcy estate to be brought in a separate
293
lawsuit are not “related to” the bankruptcy. Additional courts have
289. See, e.g., In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 293 B.R. 308, 328-29 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(using “inclusio unius est exclusio alterius” to find that 1933 Act claims may be removed
under Section 1452(a)); In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp. Sec. & Derivative Litig., No.
03 Civ. 5794, 2003 WL 23018802, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2003); In re Global Crossing
Ltd. Sec. Litig., Nos. 20 Civ. 910, 02 Civ. 10199, 2003 WL 21659360, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
July 15, 2003) (giving preference to the bankruptcy removal statute over the 1933
Act’s removal prohibition, based on the rule of recency); Carpenters Pension Trust
for S. Cal. v. Ebbers, 299 B.R. 610, 615 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (applying the rule of recency
in favor of Section 1452); Pac. Life Ins. Co. v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., No. SA CV
03-813GLT, 2003 WL 22025158, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 2003) (stating that in this
case removal was based on “related to” jurisdiction, not federal question jurisdiction,
thus removal was not prevented by Section 22(a)).
290. See Ill. Mun. Ret. Fund v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 03-465, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16255, at *5-9 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 2003); City of Birmingham Ret. & Relief Fund v.
Citigroup, Inc., No. CV-03-BE-0994-S, 2003 WL 22697225, at *5 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 12,
2003); Steel Workers Pension Trust v. Citigroup, Inc., 295 B.R. 747, 753-54 (E.D. Pa.
2003); Tenn. Consol. Ret. Sys. v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 3:03-0128, 2003 WL 22190841,
at *4 (M.D. Tenn. May 9, 2003); Ret. Sys. of Ala. v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 285 B.R.
519, 530-31 (M.D. Ala. 2002); Ret. Sys. of Ala. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 209 F. Supp. 2d
1257, 1270 (M.D. Ala. 2002); Ariail Drug Co., Inc. v. Lease Partners Corp., No. CIV.
A. 96-G-0708-S, 1996 WL 1060890, at *4-5 (N.D. Ala. May 23, 1996); In re VideOcart,
Inc., 165 B.R. 740, 743-44 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994).
291. See Tenn. Consol. Ret. Sys., 2003 WL 22190841, at *3 n.2 (finding rule of
recency favors Section 22(a) because “SLUSA, a 1998 statute amending the 1933 Act,
is the relevant comparative statute, not the original 1933 Act”).
292. See City of Birmingham Ret. & Relief Fund, 2003 WL 22697225, at *3 (finding
that “Section 22 . . . takes priority over the general removal statutes” because it
“specifically precludes removal”); Tenn. Consol. Ret. Sys., 2003 WL 22190841, at *3
(holding that Section 22(a), as amended by SLUSA, is a “special statute”); Ill. Mun.
Ret. Fund, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16255, at *6 (determining that Section 22(a) should
control over the more general provisions found in Section 1452).
293. See, e.g., City of Birmingham Ret. & Relief Fund, 2003 WL 22697225, at *5
(holding that the “primary action” has no effect on the WorldCom estate as it only
acts as a potential indemnification claim); Steel Workers Pension Trust, 295 B.R. at 750
(stating that an indemnification agreement alone does not provide the “nexus
necessary” to establish “related to” jurisdiction); Ill. Mun. Ret. Fund, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16255, at *7 (finding that the suit at issue will not affect the administration or
size of the WorldCom bankruptcy estate); Ariail Drug Co., Inc., 1996 WL 1060890, at
*3 (refusing to accept that a lawsuit regarding debtor’s interests against third party
was “related to” bankruptcy proceedings); In re VideOcart, Inc., 165 B.R. at 744
(remanding without addressing the Section 22(a)/1452(a) conflict because action by
“non-debtor against non-debtors” is not closely enough “related to” the court’s
jurisdiction as it only concerns potential claims). Indeed, the seminal decision
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declined jurisdiction for another reason not addressed by the Second
Circuit: abstention under the bankruptcy jurisdiction statute given
the “attenuated connection” between claims against non-debtors and
294
bankruptcy proceedings.
Notably, these remand decisions are
consistent with how courts have uniformly resolved an analogous
conflict in favor of the non-removal provision of the Jones Act over
295
Section 1452(a).
As the discussion above reveals, courts have struggled not only with
how to interpret the plain meaning of SLUSA’s amendment to the
non-removal provision of the 1933 Act, but also how to deal with the
practical implications of the loopholes left in its wake. The fact that
courts have been far from unanimous on both issues reveals just how
deep the ambiguities in the statute are. Moreover, the length to
which courts have gone to try to defuse the impact of orchestrated
exploitation of jurisdictional loopholes accentuates the need for
immediate legislative action.
III. PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE NON-REMOVAL
PROVISION OF THE 1933 ACT
There are numerous ambiguities and contradictions in the
jurisdictional provisions of the federal securities laws, not just in
theory, but as proven recently, in practice with real ramifications on
the conduct of securities fraud litigation. Whereas Congress was
silent in enacting the jurisdictional provisions over seventy years
296
ago, it has expressed a current intent to expand federal jurisdiction
establishing the “conceivable effect” standard for “related to” jurisdiction held that
indemnification claims to be brought in a later lawsuit were not “related to” a
bankruptcy proceeding. Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 995 (3d Cir. 1984)
(finding a potential third-party action is not “related to” bankruptcy because the
estate will not be affected unless the third-party action is actually commenced).
294. Tenn. Consol. Ret. Sys., 2003 WL 22190841, at *4 (exercising discretion to
abstain based on judicial efficiency and comity concerns); see Ret. Sys. of Ala., 209 F.
Supp. 2d at 1269; Ill. Mun. Ret. Fund, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16255, at *9; Ret. Sys. of
Ala., 285 B.R. at 531 (exercising discretionary abstention because “action is relatively
remote from the bankruptcy proceeding in that it will not have any effect on
WorldCom’s bankruptcy estate”).
295. See, e.g., Bennett v. United Kingdom Mut. Steam Ship Assurance Assoc.
(Bermuda) Ltd., No. CIV. A. 98-3237, 1999 WL 13996, at *1-2 (E.D. La. Jan. 11,
1999); McRae v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., No. Civ. A. 98-3240, 1998 WL 898467, at
*1 (E.D. La. Dec. 22, 1998) (finding that preserving Jones Act plaintiff’s choice of
forum outweighed the “possib[ility] that the tort actions against the insurer . . . could
affect the bankruptcy”); In re Durheim, 215 B.R. 876, 879-80 (D. Alaska 1997)
(finding that if a Jones Act action commences in state court, it should not be
removed to federal court because of the existence of a “strong Congressional policy
against removal of [Jones Act] claims” even where concurrent jurisdiction exists); In
re U.S. Lines, Inc., 128 B.R. 339, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Kinder v. Wis. Barge Line, Inc.,
69 B.R. 11, 13 (E.D. Mo. 1986).
296. See supra Part I.A.
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297

in both the securities and class action contexts.
Yet this intent
remains largely stunted by the non-removal provision of the 1933 Act,
the plain language of which (even as amended by SLUSA) still
prevents the removal of all individual actions and most class actions
298
brought under the 1933 Act.
As a result, whereas Congress
intended to “provide for the shifting of securities lawsuits [involving
nationally-traded securities] filed in a state court into the more
appropriate federal court” and spare defendants from having to “face
299
liability under federal securities law in fifty state courts,” issuers,
auditors, underwriters, directors, officers, and research analysts have
in fact had to defend simultaneously against both massive
consolidated actions in federal court and scores of individual actions
300
in state courts across the country.
This Article recommends an express amendment of the nonremoval provision to allow for the removal of 1933 Act claims which
“sound in fraud.” As explained below, if a 1933 Act claim appears in
a complaint containing fraud allegations, that claim should be subject
to removal. This would hold true even if such fraud allegations
support an accompanying Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 claim and are
expressly disavowed for purposes of the 1933 Act claim. On the other
hand, if the complaint alleges only negligent or innocent conduct,
the 1933 Act claims may remain in state court.
This demarcation recognizes both the unique role of fraud in 1933
301
Act claims and their interrelation with 1934 Act claims.
Indeed,
plaintiffs can—and often do—bring both 1933 Act and 1934 Act
claims for the same underlying wrong. However, whereas causes of
action under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 are for
fraud, the 1933 Act allows plaintiffs to sue for misrepresentations or
302
omissions on theories of fraud, negligence, or even strict liability.
In such instances, 1933 Act claims—although not necessarily for
fraud—may be pled in large part based on allegations of fraud.
Because of the jurisdictional framework of the federal securities laws
and the overlapping substantive bases of various causes of action
thereunder, the same fraud can generate litigation in both individual
and class actions in both state and federal court. The proposed
amendment would erase this jurisdictional disparity. All actions
alleging securities fraud—whether under the 1933 Act or 1934 Act—
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

See supra Part I.C, E.
See supra Part II.A-B.
144 CONG. REC. S4796 (daily ed. May 13, 1998) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
See supra notes 218-222 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 35, 56-65, 70 and accompanying text.
Id.
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would be heard in federal court. All actions alleging just negligence
and strict liability, which are more akin to state common law actions,
could be filed and remain in state court.
As discussed next, a “sound in fraud” distinction for jurisdictional
purposes is supported by the recent use of that exact distinction in
303
As
interpreting other features of private securities actions.
discussed thereafter, there are numerous advantages to adding this
distinction to the non-removal provision of the 1933 Act. Most
importantly, a “sound in fraud” distinction would harmonize the
statute with various expressions of legislative intent throughout the
304
history of the federal securities laws. This proposal would have the
added procedural benefit of nullifying yet another byproduct of
forum shopping of particular import in the federal securities
context—piecemeal litigation under Section 1441(c) of the federal
305
removal statutes.
Finally, the proposal would streamline the
securities fraud “race for the assets” in federal courts under uniform
standards in the interests of both judicial economy and fairness to
306
defrauded investors.
A. Legislative Use of the “Sound in Fraud” Demarcation
Congress has already shown an affinity for demarcating the federal
securities laws based on fraud. In 2002, Congress passed the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in quick response to a string of massive corporate
307
frauds.
This time, investors required protection from corporate
wrongdoers committing securities fraud rather than plaintiffs’ lawyers
308
raising such allegations.
That protection extended to private
litigants in just one respect: a prolonged limitations period.
Interestingly, Congress did not extend the period to specific federal
securities law provisions or just to fraud claims in name alone, but to
“a private right of action that involves a claim of fraud, deceit,
manipulation, or contrivance of a regulatory requirement concerning
309
the securities laws . . . .”
The applicability of this provision to 1933 Act claims is not obvious.
Without identifying any particular statutory provision, this new
303. See infra Part III.A-B.
304. See infra Part III.C.
305. See infra Part III.D.
306. See infra Part III.E; see also In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 293 B.R. 308, 334
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that ensuing litigation would be wasteful to the extent it
may deprive “many victims of . . . fraud of their fair share of any recovery”).
307. See supra note 126.
308. See supra notes 126-127.
309. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1658(b) (West 2002) (emphasis
added).
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limitations period apparently applies universally to the 1933 Act and
1934 Act despite the fact that it conflicts with various express
310
limitations periods therein. However, both the plain language and
legislative history of Section 804 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act suggest a
differentiation of 1933 Act claims depending on whether they
“involve” fraud. Congress generally intended to extend “the time
311
that people have to go in and do something about fraud.” To that
end, Congress did not limit the scope of the extended limitations
period to fraud claims in name alone. Nor did Congress limit this
period to claims under any particular statutory provision. In other
words, Congress sought to assist victims of fraud—regardless of the
federal securities law provision (i.e., the 1933 Act versus the 1934 Act)
under which they might bring their claims—as opposed to those
seeking recovery for only negligent or innocent misrepresentations.
As a result, Congress appears to have treated 1933 Act claims
disparately depending on whether they “involve” fraud.
B. Judicial Use of the “Sound in Fraud” Demarcation
Courts have similarly displayed a recent tendency to demarcate
1933 Act claims based on fraud in two areas of federal securities
jurisprudence: (1) Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and (2) Section 804 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
1.

Rule 9(b): Pleading fraud with particularity
Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
“[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances
312
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.”
Because Rule 9(b) applies to “all averments of fraud,” not just claims
of fraud, it may apply to allegations regardless of whether they are
“styled or denominated as fraud or expressed in terms of the
313
Even though
constituent elements of a fraud cause of action.”
fraud is not a required element of 1933 Act claims, most courts have
applied Rule 9(b) “insofar as the claims are premised on allegations
314
of fraud.” In other words, courts determine whether the 1933 Act
315
claim “sounds in fraud.”
310. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77m, 78r(c) (2000).
311. 148 CONG. REC. H4846 (daily ed. July 17, 2002) (statement of Rep. Markey);
see 148 CONG. REC. S6535 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (saying
that an extended limitations period should, “when there has been such enormous
fraud[,] give [plaintiffs] at least some chance to recover something”).
312. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
313. Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 171 (2d Cir. 2004).
314. Id.; see also, e.g., In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1027 (9th Cir. 2005)
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For purposes of Rule 9(b), a 1933 Act claim “sounds in fraud” if
“an examination of the factual allegations that support Plaintiffs’
[1933 Act] claim establishes that the claims are indisputably
316
immersed in unparticularized allegations of fraud.”
For example,
Rule 9(b) would apply “if a plaintiff were to attempt to establish
violations of [the 1933 Act] as well as the anti-fraud provisions of the
[1934] Act through allegations in a single complaint or a unified
317
course of fraudulent conduct.”
Although 1933 Act claims often
disavow allegations of fraud made elsewhere in the complaint, that is
“insufficient to divorce the claims from their fraudulent
318
underpinnings” for purposes of Rule 9(b).
If the complaint uses
(stating that claims that “sound in fraud” must satisfy the heightened procedural
requirements of Rule 9(b)); Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d
126 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating that allegations brought under the 1933 Act which
“sound in fraud” are subject to the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b)).
But see Kapps v. Torch Offshore, Inc., 379 F.3d 207, 210 (5th Cir. 2004) (explaining
that Section 11 claims only mandate notice pleading as opposed to the more detailed
pleading required by Rule 9(b) or the PSLRA); In re NationsMart Corp. Sec. Litig.,
130 F.3d 309, 314 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that “Rule 9(b) does not apply to claims
under § 11 of the [1933] Act, because proof of fraud or mistake is not a prerequisite
to establishing liability under § 11”).
315. Rombach, 355 F.3d at 167; see also, e.g., In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d at 1027
(“Although section 11 does not contain an element of fraud, a plaintiff may
nonetheless be subject to Rule 9(b)’s particularity mandate if his complaint ‘sounds
in fraud . . .’”); In re Adams Golf, Inc. Sec. Litig., 381 F.3d 267, 273 n.5 (3d Cir. 2004)
(noting that 1933 Act claims which do not “sound in fraud” need not comply with
the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) (citing Shapiro v. UJB Fin.
Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 288 (3d Cir. 1992))); Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d
1097, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that 1933 Act claims which “sound in
fraud” must comply with Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement); Schwartz v. Celestial
Seasonings, Inc., 124 F.3d 1246, 1252 (10th Cir. 1997) (refusing to apply Rule 9(b)
requirement to a 1933 Act claim not “premised on fraud”); In re Stac Elec. Sec. Litig.,
89 F.3d 1399, 1404 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that Rule 9(b) applies to 1933 Act claims
“grounded in fraud”); Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1223 (1st Cir.
1996) (determining that Rule 9(b) applies to 1933 Act claims which “sound in
fraud”); Shapiro, 964 F.2d at 288 (“[T]he plain language of [Rule 9(b)] clearly
encompasses § 11 and § 12(2) claims based on fraud . . .”); Sears v. Likens, 912 F.2d
889, 893 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding that Rule 9(b) applies to 1933 Act claims “sounding
in fraud”).
316. Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 394 F.3d at 160.
317. Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1223; see also Vess, 317 F.3d at 1103-04 (explaining that a
claim may “sound in fraud” and must meet Rule 9(b)’s requirements even if fraud is
not a necessary element of the claim so long as the plaintiff alleges that the
defendant engaged in a unified course of fraudulent conduct and this course of
conduct is the basis for the plaintiff’s claim).
318. Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 394 F.3d at 160; see Rombach, 355 F.3d at 172
(rejecting an effort by plaintiffs to avoid the requirements of Rule 9(b) through a
characterization of their claims in their pleading); In re Stac Elec. Sec. Litig., 89 F.3d
at 1405 n.2 (holding that disavowal of fraud allegations is “unconvincing where the
gravamen of the complaint is plainly fraud and no effort is made to show any other
basis for the claims levied at the Prospectus.”); In re Ultrafem, Inc. Sec. Litig., 91 F.
Supp. 2d 678, 690-91 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (applying Rule 9(b) where plaintiffs simply
disavowed that Rule 9(b) was applicable and made no other effort to differentiate
between their negligence and fraud claims).
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319

words or imputations which are “classically associated with fraud”
without making any effort to show an additional basis for a 1933 Act
320
claim, then the claim “sounds in fraud” and is subject to Rule 9(b).
2.

Section 804 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
As discussed above, Congress enacted a fraud demarcation of
federal securities causes of action in Section 804 of the SarbanesOxley Act. Thus far, courts have unanimously held that that
provision does not apply to Section 11 and 12 claims under the 1933
321
Act.
However, these holdings pertain to a certain subset of 1933
Act claims: those which expressly disavow any and all fraud
322
allegations or otherwise do not “sound in fraud.”
In other words,
no court has directly addressed whether Section 804 applies to a 1933
Act claim “sounding in fraud.”
Courts are increasingly indicating that the “sound in fraud”
distinction also applies to 1933 Act claims for purposes of Section 804
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Some courts have expressly found Section
804 inapplicable on the distinguishing fact that “plaintiffs’ claim
under § 11 of the Securities Act does not sound in fraud and [the
323
Sarbanes-Oxley Act] applies only to fraud claims.”
Reflecting the
319. Rombach, 355 F.3d at 172. Such words “classically associated with fraud”
include “inaccurate and misleading,” “untrue statements of material facts,” and
“materially false and misleading written statements.” Id.
320. In re Stac Elec. Sec. Litig., 89 F.3d at 1405 n.2.
321. See, e.g., Ballard v. Tyco Int’l, No. 02-MD-1335-PB, 2005 WL 928537 (D.N.H.
Apr. 22, 2005); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., Nos. 02 Civ.3288, 03 Civ. 9499, 2004
WL 1435356 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2004); ATO RAM II, Ltd. v. SMC Multimedia Corp.,
No. 03 Civ. 5569 HB, 2004 WL 744792 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2004); In re FirstEnergy
Corp. Sec. Litig., 316 F. Supp. 2d 581 (N.D. Ohio 2004) ; Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension
Plan v. Household Int’l, Inc., No. 02 C S893, 2004 WL 574665 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22,
2004); In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., No. MDL-1446, 2004 WL
405886 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2004); In re Global Crossing, Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ.
910, 2003 WL 22999478 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2003); Friedman v. Rayovac Corp., 295 F.
Supp. 2d 957, 975 (W.D. Wis. 2003); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d
431 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); In re Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 272
F. Supp. 2d 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (all refusing to extend the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to
claims under Section 11 or 12 of the 1933 Act).
322. See, e.g., Ballard, 2005 WL 928537, at *4 n.4 (noting that the plaintiffs
specifically stated that their Section 11 claim did not “sound in fraud” and excluded
all allegations of fraud from that claim); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2004 WL
1435356, at *4 n.6 (commenting that “the plaintiffs’ pleading expressly denies that
its [1933] Act claims sound in fraud”); In re FirstEnergy Corp. Sec. Litig., 316 F.
Supp. 2d at 602 (finding that plaintiffs did not intentionally claim fraud allegations);
Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan, 2004 WL 574665, at *13 n.1 (noting that the plaintiff
disavowed that its 1933 Act claims were anything other than strict liability or
negligence claims); In re Global Crossing, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 313 F. Supp. 2d at 197 n.4
(noting that plaintiffs specifically disavowed and disclaimed any allegations of fraud).
323. Ballard, 2005 WL 928537, at *4; see In re Alcatel Sec. Litig., 382 F. Supp. 2d
532, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating that Section 804 would apply if the claims “sound in
fraud”); In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 351 F. Supp. 2d 334, 365 n.16 (D.
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prevalence of the “sounding in fraud” concept, one court has even
mistakenly averred that “Section 804 expressly states that it applies to
324
‘claims sounding in fraud’” —when it actually states that it applies to
claims “involv[ing]” fraud.
Judicial interpretation of the virtually identical phrase “claim
involving fraud” in another federal statute suggests a “sound in fraud”
distinction for purposes of Section 804 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
The Contract Disputes Act provides that the United States Claims
Court has subject matter jurisdiction over claims thereunder, except
325
for “any claim involving fraud.”
In construing that exception,
courts have noted that a claim can “involve” fraud even if fraud is not
326
Rather, claims “involving fraud” encompass
a required element.
“claims which arise from the same actions that lead to the fraud claim
327
and merely constitute alternative pleadings.”
1933 Act claims are
often just that: alternative theories of recovery for the same alleged
fraudulent scheme underlying Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 claims.
C. Consistency with Legislative Intent
A demarcation of 1933 Act claims based on fraud not only is
already employed in federal securities legislation and jurisprudence,
but also would harmonize the federal securities jurisdictional
framework with the legislative history of both the 1933 Act itself and
the recent enactments pertaining to private securities actions and,
more generally, class actions.
Md. 2004) (stating that Section 804 applies to fraud-based claims but Section 804
does not apply to Section 11 or Section 12 claims which do not “sound in fraud”); In
re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d at 441 (recognizing that Section 804
applies to claims under the 1933 Act and 1934 Act which “sound in fraud”); see also In
re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 2004 WL 405886, at *11 (recognizing
that the availability of Section 804’s longer statute of limitations under a 1933 Act
claim depends upon whether the claim “involves ‘fraud, deceit, manipulation, or
contrivance’”); Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan, 2004 WL 574665, at *13 (concluding
that the extended limitations period under Section 804 is inapplicable to non-fraudbased 1933 Act claims).
324. In re AOL Time Warner, Inc. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 381 F. Supp. 2d 192, 208
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
325. 41 U.S.C. § 605(a) (2000).
326. See infra note 327.
327. United States v. United Techs., Corp., No. C-3-99-03, 2000 WL 988238, at *4
(S.D. Ohio Mar. 20, 2000); see also United States v. Baker & Taylor, Inc., No. C-951825, 1998 WL 230979, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 1998) (determining that claims
“involve fraud” where they “serve as alternative theories of recovery for the alleged
fraudulent pricing scheme”); United States v. Unified Indus., Inc., 929 F. Supp. 947,
951 (E.D. Va. 1996) (declaring that breach of contract claim “involved fraud”
because it was “intimately bound up with and part of the same case or controversy as”
fraud claim); United States v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 795 F. Supp. 1131, 1135 (N.D. Ga.
1992) (noting that a claim “involves fraud” where “the events, transactions, and
contracts at issue in the lawsuit give rise to fraud allegations”).
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As discussed above, there is no indication of exactly why Congress
328
However, given the
enacted the non-removal provision in 1933.
overriding theme of investor protection in the 1933 Act and the
express intent of the few other federal non-removal statutes, it is
likely that the protection of the plaintiff’s choice of forum was
329
paramount.
This proposed amendment to the non-removal
provision preserves that implicit legislative intent, as plaintiffs may
still remain in state court on 1933 Act claims if they plead their claims
on a certain factual predicate. In other words, plaintiffs would only
face removal if the gravamen of their claim is fraudulent conduct—
that is, if the misrepresentations or omissions underlying the 1933
Act claim are part of overarching fraudulent conduct.
Moreover, given that the legislative history of the federal securities
laws itself sounds in fraud, there is an apparent intent to have all
securities fraud litigation heard in federal court. The 1933 Act and
330
1934 Act served to deter the commission of fraud.
In 1995, the
PSLRA was enacted to put an end to the abuses of securities fraud
331
class actions. As a result, a significant portion of the PSLRA—most
notably, the heightened pleading requirements—applies only to
332
fraud claims under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5.
Moreover, most of the PSLRA’s measures apply only to actions filed
333
in federal court.
In 1998, SLUSA was enacted to prevent plaintiffs from avoiding the
PSLRA’s mandates by filing claims in state court. As a result, SLUSA
perpetuated the particular concerns over securities fraud litigation.
Congress made this clear in its express legislative findings: “[I]n
order to prevent certain State private securities class action lawsuits
alleging fraud from being used to frustrate the objectives of the
328. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 44, 66 and accompanying text.
331. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 39 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 738 (“The Conference Committee recognizes the need to reduce significantly
the filing of meritless securities lawsuits without hindering the ability of victims of
fraud to pursue legitimate claims.”); 141 CONG. REC. 35300 (1995) (statement of Sen.
Grams) (explaining that the PSLRA would “make some modest and reasonable
changes which will help weed out the most abusive lawsuits in the field of securities
litigation while at the same time, preserving the right of action for shareholders who
are truly victimized by securities fraud”); 141 CONG. REC. 17546 (1995) (statement of
Sen. Rockefeller) (“[The PSLRA] would go a long way toward curtailing what I
believe is an epidemic of frivolous securities fraud lawsuits that are brought by a
small cadre of lawyers”). Indeed, three years later, Congress expressly highlighted
the fact that the PSLRA was passed in an effort to prevent abuses in the filing of
private securities fraud lawsuits. H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, § 2, ¶ 1 (1998) (Conf. Rep.).
332. See supra notes 109-112 and accompanying text.
333. See supra note 113.
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[PSLRA], it is appropriate to enact national standards for securities
334
In
class action lawsuits involving nationally traded securities . . . .”
other words, “[t]he solution to this problem is to make Federal court
the exclusive venue for most securities fraud class action litigation
335
involving nationally traded securities.”
This theme recurred
336
throughout the SLUSA debates.
Fraud claims have therefore been targeted as the main conduit
through which plaintiffs’ lawyers seek maximum settlements based on
minimum allegations of wrongdoing. The PSLRA heightened the
requirements for such claims, and SLUSA sought to have such
requirements more uniformly applied under federal law in federal
337
courts. Yet, Congress’ work is unfinished. Sophisticated plaintiffs’
lawyers have foregone fraud claims under the 1934 Act in order to
bring quasi-fraud claims under the 1933 Act for the same wrongdoing
under different standards in different fora—namely, state courts
across the country.

334. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 § 2, ¶ 5, Pub. L. No. 105353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified at scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (emphasis added); see
also supra note 124.
335. H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 15 (emphasis added). Indeed, courts have defined
the scope of state law claims falling within the purview of SLUSA based on fraud
being a “necessary component” thereof. See, e.g., Xpedior Creditor Trust v. Credit
Suisse First Boston (USA) Inc., 341 F. Supp. 2d 258, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding
that a state law claim falls under SLUSA if it “asserts (1) an explicit claim of fraud
(e.g., common law fraud or fraudulent inducement), or (2) other garden-variety state
law claims that ‘sound in fraud’”).
336. See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. H10771 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Bliley) (“If there is intentional fraud, there is nothing in [SLUSA] or in the [PSLRA]
to prevent those cases from proceeding. We do not need to exacerbate market
downturns by allowing companies to be dragged into court every time their stock
price falls. The [PSLRA] remedied that problem for Federal courts, and this
legislation will remedy it for State courts.”); 144 CONG. REC. S12447 (daily ed. Oct.
13, 1998) (statement of Sen. Domenici) (recognizing SLUSA was designed to
“provide one set of rules to govern securities fraud class actions”); id. at S12448
(statement of Sen. Dodd) (“[SLUSA] is intended to create a uniform national
standard for securities fraud class actions involving nationally-traded securities.”); id.
at S12445 (Letter from Arthur Levitt to Senators D’Amato and Sarbanes (Oct. 9,
1998)) (“The purpose of the bill is to help ensure that securities fraud class actions
involving certain securities traded on national markets are governed by a single set of
uniform standards.”); 144 CONG. REC. H10781 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1998) (statement of
Rep. Cox) (“[SLUSA] will make federal courts the exclusive venue for large-scale
securities fraud lawsuits involving securities subject to federal regulation”); 144
CONG. REC. H6058 (daily ed. July 21, 1998) (statement of Rep. Tauzin) (“Lawsuits
brought on fraud charges both in State and Federal courts can go forward. They
simply go forward under the reforms we passed both on the Federal law and now
conforming that Federal law to the 50 States.”).
337. Congress again focused on fraud in enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002.
See supra notes 126-127 and accompanying text. The one amendment to private
rights of action is yet another example of the legislative trend of demarcating
securities claims based on fraud. See supra Part III.A.
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Congress had its chance to address this latest loophole in part (that
is, in terms of class actions) in CAFA, which targeted forum shopping
by expanding federal jurisdiction over class actions of national
338
interest. However, Congress expressly exempted the securities laws
339
from CAFA. Congress created this exemption despite the fact that
CAFA echoes the dual intent underlying—but far from fully
effectuated by—SLUSA: (1) for federal courts to adjudicate suits of
national interest, such as those involving nationally traded
340
341
securities; and (2) to combat forum shopping via artful pleading.
Whereas SLUSA addressed forum shopping by establishing removal
and preemption of state law causes of action, CAFA allows federal
courts “in the interests of justice” in certain circumstances to evaluate
complaints as to (1) the intent for their filing in state rather than
federal court, and (2) their potential effect on parallel litigation in
342
other courts.
As to the former discretionary tool, the federal court may now
exercise diversity jurisdiction where the complaint has been drafted
343
in a manner that seeks to avoid federal jurisdiction.
Specifically,
the court may assess “whether the plaintiffs have proposed a natural
class that encompasses all of the people and claims that one would
expect to include in a class action, as opposed to proposing a class
that appears to be gerrymandered solely to avoid federal jurisdiction
344
by leaving out certain potential class members or claims.”
As to the latter, CAFA allows courts to consider whether other
similar class actions have been recently filed to allow for coordination
345
of parallel actions.
“The purpose of this factor is efficiency and
fairness: To determine whether a matter should be subject to Federal
jurisdiction so that it can be coordinated with other overlapping or
338. See supra notes 150-153 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 167-172 and accompanying text.
340. Compare supra note 116 (SLUSA) (noting that SLUSA aimed to create
uniform federal standards for securities traded nationally), with supra notes 150-152,
157 (CAFA) (explaining how Congress intended CAFA to send class actions of a
“truly national” nature to federal courts).
341. Compare supra notes 116-117 (SLUSA) (describing Congress’s desire to limit
forum shopping through the passage of SLUSA), with supra notes 153-155, 158-159
(CAFA) (stating that the primary goal of CAFA was to limit forum shopping in state
courts in class action litigation).
342. Specifically, this additional evaluation of complaints is warranted where
between one-and two-thirds of the plaintiff class and named defendants are citizens
of the state in which the action was filed. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
§ 4(a)(2), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(3) (West 2005).
343. Id.
344. 151 CONG. REC. H730 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner).
345. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(3)(F).
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346

parallel class actions.” This last factor is to be broadly interpreted
so that “plaintiffs [cannot] plead around it with creative legal
347
theories.”
These tactics addressed in CAFA are exactly those left in the wake
of SLUSA by means of the non-removal provision of the 1933 Act. As
made clear in the WorldCom litigation, securities plaintiffs’ lawyers
have purposefully raised only 1933 Act claims and foregone 1934 Act
348
claims simply to remain in state court.
Furthermore, these state
filings on virtually identical factual allegations have frustrated the
management of consolidated actions proceeding on parallel tracks in
349
federal court. Nonetheless, Congress left these tactics unhindered
350
by expressly exempting the federal securities laws from CAFA.
These CAFA provisions would serve to curtail this forum shopping
and its real implications in the securities law context. Yet the fact that
CAFA expressly exempts the federal securities laws suggests that an
extension of CAFA’s measures thereto would directly contradict
express legislative intent. However, as described above, it is unclear
whether Congress understands what that “intent” is. In other words,
Congress exempted the federal securities laws from CAFA on the
assumption that SLUSA resulted in a “carefully crafted framework”
for federal versus state jurisdiction of federal securities claims.
Indeed, the disparity between SLUSA’s legislative intent and effect—
and the judicial discord over both the meaning and consequences of
SLUSA’s amendment—strongly suggest that this framework was not
so “carefully crafted.”
At first glance, a simple solution appears to be the repeal of CAFA’s
exemption of the federal securities laws. If that were the case, courts
could discretionarily evaluate complaints for removal purposes only
in class actions. As the WorldCom litigation illustrates, however,
plaintiffs’ lawyers are more than willing to forego class actions to take
351
advantage of jurisdictional loopholes. Therefore, there must be an
amendment of the non-removal provision itself to apply to both
individual and class actions. Nonetheless, the “sound in fraud”
demarcation captures the intent of CAFA, as the evaluation of
complaints for claims “sounding in fraud” would mirror the new
judicial discretionary tools targeting the forum shopping so palpably
346. 151 CONG. REC. H728 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner).
347. Id.
348. See supra notes 220-223 and accompanying text.
349. See supra notes 226-239 and accompanying text.
350. See supra notes 167-172 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 220-223 and accompanying text.
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addressed generally in Congress’s latest endeavor, but bizarrely
untouched in terms of the federal securities laws.
D. Avoiding Piecemeal Litigation under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c)
Demarcating 1933 Act claims for removal purposes based on
whether they “sound in fraud” would also resolve another
jurisdictional glitch caused by the non-removal provision: piecemeal
litigation under Section 1441(c) of the general removal statutes.
That statute provides:
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action
within the jurisdiction conferred by section 1331 of this title is
joined with one or more otherwise non-removable claims or causes
of action, the entire case may be removed and the district court
may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand
352
all matters in which State law predominates.

Like SLUSA and CAFA, Section 1441(c) was intended to protect
defendants from forum shopping and artful pleading. First, if
defendants can remove a claim invoking federal jurisdiction if sued
upon alone, “they should not be deprived of that right merely
because the plaintiff or plaintiffs joined in the state court action
additional claims that might not support federal subject matter
353
jurisdiction.”
Second, Section 1441(c) serves to promote judicial
economy by “avoid[ing] piecemeal litigation” of claims which should
354
be heard together.
Most courts have held that Section 1441(c) trumps federal nonremoval provisions—in other words, that an otherwise non-removable
claim may be removed if the conditions set forth in Section 1441(c)
355
are satisfied. One such condition is that the claim raising a federal
352. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (2000).
353. David D. Siegel, Commentary on 1988 and 1990 Revisions of Section 1441, in 28
U.S.C.A. § 1441 (West 1994).
354. Id.; see also U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 348 F. Supp. 1004, 1015 (D. Del. 1972)
(noting that Section 1441(c)’s purpose is two-fold: first, to assure that defendants
will not be prevented from enjoying a federal forum by plaintiffs’ joinder of nonremovable claims that are separate and independent; and second, to promote
judicial economy by assuring that claims that should be litigated together are
litigated in the same forum).
355. See, e.g., Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 1988);
Gonsalves v. Amoco Shipping Co., 733 F.2d 1020, 1023-26 (2d Cir. 1984); Newton v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 958 F. Supp. 248 (W.D.N.C. 1997); Farmers &
Merchs. Bank v. Hamilton Hotel Partners of Jacksonville L.P., 702 F. Supp. 1417
(W.D. Ark. 1988); Palser v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 698 F. Supp. 793 (E.D. Mo. 1988);
Cacioppe v. Superior Holsteins III, Ltd., 650 F. Supp. 607 (S.D. Tex. 1986); Titus v.
Reynolds Metals Co., 637 F. Supp. 369 (D. Md. 1986); Kinsey v. Nestor Exploration
Ltd.—1981A, 604 F. Supp. 1365 (E.D. Wash. 1985); Abing v. Paine, Webber, Jackson
& Curtis, 538 F. Supp. 1193, 1197 (D. Minn. 1982); Hages v. Aliquippa & S. R.R. Co.,
427 F. Supp. 889 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Armstrong v. Monex Int’l, Ltd., 413 F. Supp. 567
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question must be “separate and independent” from the non356
removable claim. The Supreme Court established that “a separate
and independent” action does not exist for purposes of Section
1441(c) if there is “a single wrong to plaintiff . . . arising from an
357
interlocked series of transactions.” This is true even if a party seeks
redress for that single wrong under “multiple theories of liability
358
against multiple defendants.”
This standard is rarely satisfied in the federal securities context,
given the conflicting jurisdictional provisions of claims under the
1933 Act and 1934 Act for the same wrongdoing. Specifically, a
Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 claim is rarely “separate and independent”
from an accompanying 1933 Act claim, as both claims are often
359
premised on the same underlying fraud. This is so even if the 1933
Act claim, with its lower and fewer pleading requirements, is based
only on some of the factual allegations underlying the 1934 Act
360
claim.
(N.D. Okla. 1976); Milton R. Barrie Co. v. Levine, 390 F. Supp. 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
U.S. Indus., Inc., 348 F. Supp. at 1015-16; Meinerz v. Harding Bros. Oil & Gas Co., 343
F. Supp. 681 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Korber v. Lehman, 221 F. Supp. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
But see Gamble v. Cent. of Ga. Ry. Co., 486 F.2d 781, 784 (5th Cir. 1973)
(commenting that non-removal provision for FELA claims made removing state
court instituted FELA suits to federal court on any grounds (i.e., Section 1441(c))
impossible); Green v. Hajoca Corp., 573 F. Supp. 1120, 1123 (E.D. Va. 1983)
(holding that “§ 1441(c) is simply inapplicable to” statutorily non-removable claims).
356. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c).
357. Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 14 (1951).
358. Texas v. Walker, 142 F.3d 813, 817 (5th Cir. 1998).
359. See, e.g., Crowe v. Deutsch Bank, 330 F. Supp. 2d 813, 817 (S.D. Miss. 2004)
(remanding case containing 1933 Act, 1934 Act, and state law claims because “the
1934 Act claim cannot fairly be said to be ‘separate and independent’ from the 1933
Act claim” within the contemplation of Section 1441(c)); Shorty v. Top Rank of La.,
Inc., 876 F. Supp. 838, 840 (E.D. La. 1995) (“The 1934 Act claim is not separate and
independent from the 1933 Act claim because both involve a single wrong to the
plaintiffs.”). 1933 Act claims have also been kept out of federal court when not
“separate and independent” from other federal law claims or, prior to the
amendment of Section 1441(c) in 1990, state law claims giving rise to diversity
jurisdiction. See Emrich, 846 F.2d at 1197 (remanding 1933 Act claim because the
asserted RICO claim was not “separate and independent” from the 1933 Act claim);
Peoples Nat’l Bank v. Darling, No. 91-1052-K, 1991 WL 45716, at *6 (D. Kan. Apr. 1,
1991) (remanding multi-count case to state court where 1933 Act claims were simply
interlocked and closely related “alternative theories of liability” seeking single relief
for one wrong); Abing, 538 F. Supp. at 1197 (remanding entire action where 1933 Act
claim not separate and independent from Investment Advisers Act and state law
claims asserting same “right to be dealt with in an open, fair, and professional
manner in their business transactions”); Milton R. Barrie Co., Inc., 390 F. Supp. at 477
(remanding both state law and 1933 Act claims as “alternative theories of recovery
for the single wrong . . . as a result of defendants’ alleged misrepresentations”); Pinto
v. Maremont Corp., 326 F. Supp. 165, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Korber, 221 F. Supp. at
359-60.
360. See Crowe, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 818 (reasoning that, though plaintiff’s 1934 Act
claim appeared to encompass a broader range of conduct than did his 1933 Act
claim, the alleged misrepresentations that form the basis of the 1933 Act claim fall
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Courts have already confronted the forum shopping inherent in
the pleading of dependent non-removable (e.g., 1933 Act) claims to
prevent removal under Section 1441(c). One prominent means
established for that purpose has been the “fraudulent joinder”
concept, under which the merits of the “otherwise non-removable
claims” are preliminarily assessed under a “summary judgment-like
procedure . . . that as a matter of law there was no reasonable basis
361
for predicting that the plaintiff might establish liability.” However,
362
Moreover, that burden is often
that burden is a “heavy one.”
insurmountable in terms of 1933 Act claims given the fact that a
plaintiff is more likely to satisfy the lower substantive and pleading
requirements of a 1933 Act claim as compared to the accompanying
363
Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 claim.
Because the fraudulent joinder rule has little effect with respect to
1933 Act claims, an additional tool to combat the loopholes of
Section 1441(c) is necessary. The proposed amendment would serve
that purpose. 1933 Act claims which “sound in fraud” are those
which are not “separate and independent” from nominal fraud
claims, such as those under Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5, because they
are based most likely on the same allegations of wrongdoing.
Whereas 1933 Act claims “sounding in fraud” rarely—if ever—are
“separate and independent” from Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 claims,
the proposed amendment would eliminate the other precondition to
Section 1441(c): their non-removability. In other words, Section
1441(c) is not even implicated if the claims are removable in the first
within the range of conduct underlying the 1934 Act claim as not to be a “separate
and independent” claim).
361. Burchett v. Cargill, Inc., 48 F.3d 173, 176 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting B., Inc. v.
Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545, 551 (5th Cir. 1981)); see also Feichko v. Denver &
Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 213 F.3d 586, 589 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting in dicta “that a
fraudulent attempt to evade removal may provide an exception to the operation of
[a non-removal provision]”); Lackey v. Atl. Richfield Co., 990 F.2d 202, 207 (5th Cir.
1993) (allowing removing party to show that “the [non-removable] Jones Act claim
has been fraudulently pleaded to prevent removal”); Hutton v. Consol. Grain &
Barge Co., 170 F. Supp. 2d 844, 846 (C.D. Ill. 2001) (“When a plaintiff has alleged a
claim that is not removable . . . , the Court can look beyond the pleadings to
determine whether plaintiff has any chance of prevailing on the nonremovable
claim.”).
362. Burchett, 48 F.3d at 176.
363. See, e.g., Milton R. Barrie Co., 390 F. Supp. at 477 (reasoning that 1933 Act
claim was not so baseless even if complaint was amended to add such claim as “part
of plaintiff’s ‘unworthy scheme’ to ‘oust’ the federal court of jurisdiction”); Korber,
221 F. Supp. at 360 (determining that a 1933 Act claim not “so farfetched that its
inclusion in the complaint is a fraud on the jurisdiction of [the] Court”). However,
1933 Act claims have been found to be “fraudulently joined” based on fundamental
legal—as opposed to mere pleading—deficiencies. See, e.g., Bennett v. Bally Mfg.
Corp., 785 F. Supp. 559, 562 (D.S.C. 1992) (finding 1933 Act claim “fraudulently
joined” because “§ 12(2) does not apply to secondary market transactions”).
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place. Therefore, rather than being partitioned under that removal
statute, the entire case could be efficiently heard in federal court if
1933 Act claims “sounding in fraud” were removable.
E. Fairness to Defrauded Investors
In its current state, the non-removal provision of the 1933 Act has
led to a “race for the assets” as plaintiffs seek recovery for securities
fraud in both individual and class actions in both state and federal
courts. While offering a wider choice of forum, these permutations
actually disserve plaintiffs in many respects. As an initial matter, the
costs incurred by defendants in duplicative litigation deplete the
funds from which plaintiffs are eventually paid. “As deep as some of
the pockets in this action may be, they are in all likelihood not
364
limitless.” In effect, the pendency of parallel actions in an array of
state courts undermines the efficiencies otherwise achievable by the
365
consolidation of related actions in federal court.
This disparate playing field promises not only fewer assets for
defrauded investors, but unfair distribution among them. Plaintiffs
face various procedural and substantive requirements in the range of
litigation spurned by the jurisdictional provisions of the federal
securities laws, depending on whether they proceed in state court
versus federal court, and in individual actions versus class actions. As
a result, plaintiffs could be subject to inconsistent rulings in these
366
different venues with potentially preclusive effect on other actions.
Moreover, plaintiffs in individual actions and/or state court would
not enjoy the PSLRA’s procedural safeguards for plaintiff class
367
members against their lawyers.
The proposal herein would alleviate these equitable concerns.
First, if all securities actions “sounding in fraud” were in federal
court, judicial efficiency would be achieved by the consolidation of all
364. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 293 B.R. 308, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
365. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000) (permitting the transfer of multidistrict litigation
into a consolidated proceeding in the interest of efficiency).
366. See In re King Pharms., Inc., Case No. 2:03-CV-77, slip op. at 4 (E.D. Tenn.
Feb. 6, 2004) (warning that parallel litigation of 1933 Act claims in state court and
1934 Act claims in federal court “asserting substantially similar claims . . . could lead
to considerable confusion if not outright inconsistent results”); In re WorldCom, Inc.
Sec. Litig., 315 F. Supp. 2d 527, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
367. See supra notes 104-105, 107-108 and accompanying text. Investors may not be
made aware of these differences, as it is not necessarily in plaintiffs’ lawyers’ personal
interests to disclose them. In fact, Judge Cote found the differences substantial
enough—and the disclosures by plaintiffs’ lawyers deficient enough—to require
curative notices be sent to plaintiffs both before her and in individual actions in state
courts around the country. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. Civ.02-3288, 2003
WL 22701241, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2003).
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related individual and class actions at least for pretrial purposes.
Second, without the jurisdictional loophole, plaintiffs’ lawyers may
see less advantage in filing 1933 Act claims “sounding fraud” than
Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 claims. With more plaintiffs proceeding
on the same allegations of wrongdoing under the same procedural
and substantive standards and in the same forum, their recovery
could be both more widely and equitably distributed.
CONCLUSION
A “sound in fraud” demarcation of 1933 Act claims for
jurisdictional purposes would both remedy the many problems and
procure the many benefits identified in this Article.
This
demarcation would harmonize the jurisdictional framework of the
federal securities laws with various expressions of legislative intent.
First, the original intent of the non-removal provision of the 1933 Act
would be preserved, as plaintiffs could still choose to have their 1933
Act claims heard in state court if pled in a certain fashion—that is,
not premised on underlying fraudulent conduct. Second, the
demarcation would strengthen the historic interrelation of the 1933
Act and 1934 Act, which are meant to offer “distinct causes of action
368
and are intended to address different types of wrongdoing.” Third,
the removal of 1933 Act claims “sounding in fraud” would fulfill
SLUSA’s endeavor to have all claims “alleging fraud” regarding
nationally traded securities administered in federal court under
uniform standards, and would be consistent with the measures
recently espoused by Congress in CAFA.
One likely criticism of this proposal is that it would still leave a
loophole for the filing of 1933 Act claims in state court—plaintiffs
could simply proceed in state court under theories of negligence and
strict liability. However, this “loophole” would largely remain in
theory given the real consequences accompanying its use. To remain
in state court under this scenario, plaintiffs would have to forego any
allegations of fraud that might otherwise support their claims. It is
unlikely that plaintiffs’ lawyers equipped with such allegations would
eviscerate federal securities claims just for jurisdictional purposes. If
there were in fact no allegations of fraud supporting the claims, then
plaintiffs would still have the choice of forum intended by the nonremoval provision. Indeed, Congress has never expressed an intent
to disrupt that choice of forum, as it has only sought to have all

368. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 381 (1983).
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369

claims “alleging fraud” heard in federal court.
Moreover, whereas
securities fraud actions have become increasingly federalized through
a series of unique substantive and procedural requirements under
federal law (and applicable only in federal court), 1933 Act claims
premised merely on negligence and strict liability remain largely
analogous to state common law actions. Therefore, such claims are
particularly suitable for adjudication by state courts.
Another likely criticism of a “sound in fraud” approach is the
introduction of even more ambiguity and consequential uncertainty
in judicial interpretations of the non-removal provision of the 1933
370
Act. As an initial matter, this demarcation is not a foreign concept
in federal securities legislation and jurisprudence. In fact, Congress’s
only change to private causes of action under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
took this exact form, and courts have been rather uniform in
371
deciding what 1933 Act claims “sound in fraud.” Moreover, forum
shopping by its very nature thrives on exceptions to rules, and
therefore may be best addressed by more flexible standards. Indeed,
Congress saw fit in CAFA to give federal courts the discretion to
evaluate complaints to ensure that federal courts adjudicate suits of
national interest and to provide equity and efficiency in parallel
litigation that would otherwise be waged in various fora. A similar
evaluation of both individual and class action complaints for claims
“sounding in fraud” would serve these dual intents underlying but far
from effectuated by SLUSA.
Investor protection from fraud has been the overriding goal of
Congress with respect to the private causes of action under the
federal securities laws—either from those committing fraud or those
raising allegations of fraud purportedly on their behalf. The nonremoval provision of the 1933 Act was a rare step in one direction,
and has failed to reach equipoise amidst the rising conflict of those
369. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 § 2, Pub. L. No. 105353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified at scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
370. Indeed, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was widely criticized for its ambiguous
language in establishing an express limitations period for any federal securities claim
“involv[ing]” fraud. See supra note 142.
371. See supra Part III.B. However, one apparent discrepancy is whether 1933 Act
claims for which all fraud allegations are expressly disavowed may still “sound in
fraud.” Compare Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 160 (3d
Cir. 2004) (holding that for purposes of Rule 9(b), disavowal of fraud allegations is
“insufficient to divorce the claims from their fraudulent underpinnings”), with
Ballard v. Tyco Int’l, No. 02-MD-1335-PB, 2005 WL 928537, *4 n.4 (D.N.H. Apr. 22,
2005) (“Plaintiffs expressly state in their complaint that their § 11 claim . . . ‘does not
sound in fraud’ and that ‘[a]ll of the preceding allegations of fraud or fraudulent
conduct and/or motive are specifically excluded from this Count.’”). Such 1933 Act
claims should be deemed to “sound in fraud” so that the problems identified herein
are not perpetuated by the simple disavowal of allegations.
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forces over time. In effect, Congress has transformed the choice of
forum inherent in that provision from an asset to plaintiffs against
corporate wrongdoers, to a liability in the hands of plaintiffs’ lawyers
who have used it to file duplicative litigation to the detriment of their
clients. A “sound in fraud” demarcation, however, would recognize
the unique role of fraud in 1933 Act claims and would harmonize
both forms of investor protection which, despite their conflicts,
themselves “sound in fraud.” By coming to terms with its own
oversights and heeding its recent enactments in the manner
proposed here, Congress could finally achieve its goal of closing the
jurisdictional loopholes in federal securities litigation.

